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ABSTRACT
Scholarship on tribunals for mass human rights violations overlooks how the presence or
absence of conflict influences its effectiveness. I argue that implementing a tribunal
during conflict undermines its ability to effectively pursue justice—as I demonstrate with
a case study of the Yugoslav Tribunal. Ongoing conflict makes challenges of transitional
justice more acute. The absence of conflict eases a tribunal’s ability to carry out certain
necessary activities such as collecting evidence. I demonstrate this using a case study of
the Rwanda Tribunal. Examining tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia suggests that
hybrid structures influence the effectiveness of these accountability mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
The 20th century was witness to the deaths of millions of civilians. The majority
of these deaths were not a byproduct of war; they were a result of systematic targeting of
civilian populations. In the aftermath of mass human rights violations in Rwanda, the
former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and elsewhere, the horrors of genocide and other crimes
against humanity entered into mainstream consciousness. In the years after these
tragedies, human rights organizations, scholars of international criminal law, and certain
state governments have pressured the international community to focus on ending
impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes. Accountability mechanisms such as ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, national trials, newly developed ‘hybrid’ tribunals, and
truth and reconciliation commissions, attempt to come to terms with the past by
punishing those responsible for the pain and suffering of hundreds of thousands of
people. Crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture fall under the
jurisdiction of the aforementioned trial-based courts. In the 1990s, ad hoc international
criminal tribunals were established in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Currently,
there are also various types of accountability mechanisms operating in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, East Timor, Cambodia, and elsewhere.
With the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is likely that
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms will be more frequently implemented during
ongoing conflict.1 If this does in fact turn out to be the case then scholars and advocates
of human rights will be ill-prepared to determine what effect ongoing conflict has on an
1

In July 2008, the ICC issued an indictment for the arrest of Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the President of
Sudan. Al-Bashir is charged with genocide and his indictment is the first ever issued against an incumbent
head of state. This indictment is also notable since Sudan is still in the throes of war and mass violations of
human rights. It is too soon to tell whether or not the ICC will successfully apprehend and prosecute alBashir.
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accountability mechanism’s ability to effectively pursue justice. This project is driven by
a desire to seriously consider the influence of timing on prosecutorial accountability
mechanisms. Two principal questions drive this research paper:
•

How does implementing a tribunal during conflict influence its ability to achieve
its objectives?

•

How does implementing a tribunal after conflict has ended influence its ability to
achieve its objectives?

An effective judicial organ must be able to conduct the following activities: collect
evidence, gather witness testimony, apprehend suspects, carry out trials that are viewed
as fair and efficient, retain close contact with the people for whom justice is rendered (i.e.
those that suffered, witnessed, and/or participated in the atrocities), disable institutions
responsible for supporting or perpetuating human rights violations, augment and support
the domestic judicial system in the area where the relevant crimes were committed.
In order to answer my two research questions, I utilize case studies of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).2 My case studies indicate the following. The
ICTY case shows that when a tribunal is established in the presence of conflict, timing is
important in that it leads to the following conditions: inability for the tribunal to be
located in the region in which the violations of human rights are taking place, lack of
security for staff and tribunal personnel, difficulty apprehending suspects, and difficulty
collecting evidence and gathering witness testimony. These conditions negatively
influence the effectiveness of the ICTY. The ICTR case shows that when a tribunal is
2

The ICC has only recently begun issuing indictments, and in consideration of the fact that this project
examines circumstances of implementation, there are not enough cases of ICC action. Thus, I refrain from
discussing the ICC and instead focus on the two existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals.
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established after violence and in the absence of conflict, timing is important in that it
allows for the following conditions to arise: greater security for staff and tribunal
personnel, the consolidation of a stable government, increased likelihood of locating the
tribunal in or close to the region where the relevant crimes took place, greater access to
evidence and witnesses. My findings from the ICTR case indicate that when a tribunal
operates in the absence of conflict, it is less likely to encounter conditions that hinder its
ability to achieve its goals and be an effective judicial organ. However, despite the
ICTR’s implementation in the aftermath of conflict, the Tribunal still struggled to achieve
some of its objectives. In light of this, I suggest that factors outside of timing should be
considered in the hopes that such an examination will strengthen future tribunals.
This project concludes by examining how hybrid structure influences tribunals’
ability to achieve the four objectives of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. I use
brief case studies of hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia to assess this
influence. The Special Court in Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) demonstrate that two elements of hybrid structure help
determine the tribunals’ effectiveness: location of the tribunals, and the mixed
composition (foreign and domestic judges) of the tribunals. An assessment of how
hybrid structure influences the SCSL and ECCC’s ability to successfully pursue justice,
may lead to future tribunals that are more efficient and effective.
Significance of Research
This project is motivated by what I see as a gap in the literature on prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms for mass human rights violations. Although the extant
scholarship evaluates the successes and failures of tribunals from many different angles,
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no in-depth research has been conducted on the particular influence that timing may have
on a tribunal. When the timing of a tribunal is discussed, it is only peripherally
mentioned. Thus far, there has been little to no scholarship focusing on the potential
influence that implementation during conflict and implementation after conflict have on a
tribunal’s ability to achieve its goals. This project seeks to fill this gap. I employ case
studies that allow me to analyze how the presence or absence of conflict impacts a
tribunal’s effectiveness. There are many comparative case studies that have been
conducted in this field. The most frequent of which compares the ICTY and the ICTR.
This project lends a new angle to this scholarship. Instead of a broad comparison, this
project focuses more narrowly on the influence that the presence or absence of conflict
has on the two tribunals’ ability to succeed in attaining the central objectives of
individual accountability, re-establishment of rule of law, creation and dissemination of
an accurate historical record, and deterrence of future crimes.
This project also hopes to contribute to the advancement of prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms. In the last part of this project, I examine the hybrid tribunals
in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. Implementing a conflict after violence does not erase all
the challenges of pursuing justice. This project suggests that the hybrid structure is
worthy of further in-depth research. As a new development in prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms, hybrid tribunals may provide some remedies to the problems
that continued to plague the ICTR. This project will provide a base from which scholars
and policy makers can begin to determine how to improve future prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms.

9

Methodology
Tribunals have been established in two different circumstances: 1) during conflict
and continued human rights violations; 2) in the aftermath of mass human rights
violations. In this paper I examine how these two contexts influence a tribunal’s ability
to achieve the four objectives elaborated on below. Comparative case studies are central
to this project. In order to assess the influence that ongoing conflict and absence of
conflict has on the effectiveness of tribunals, I compare four case studies. Conducting
case studies of existing tribunals allows me to explore how a variable like timing,
influences the effectiveness of a justice organ. Ultimately, this project will provide
another lens through which to view the logic and mechanisms of tribunals for mass
human rights violations. This project is less concerned with contributing to theories of
transitional justice, and more with providing studies that will contribute to the future
development of more effective and efficient accountability mechanisms. Case studies
allow me to use real-world examples to draw conclusions about how the presence or
absence of conflict influences the effectiveness of tribunals.
Determining whether or not a tribunal is effective is a difficult but necessary task.
First, an effective tribunal must be able to achieve certain objectives. For the purposes of
evaluation I identify and use four goals that are the most frequently articulated in the
literature on prosecutorial accountability mechanism, and in the statutes of the tribunals
examined. All four objectives are extremely complex, but this project does not set out to
examine all aspects of each. The next paragraph will briefly set out the criteria upon
which each objective will be assessed.
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The first goal of prosecutorial mechanisms is individual criminal responsibility.3
Central to this objective is the determination to prosecute those ‘most responsible’ for the
atrocities committed. I evaluate this objective based on the number of people indicted,
arrested, and convicted and based on the level of responsibility these perpetrators
represent. The second goal is re-establishing rule of law. This objective has the potential
to consist of numerous elements. For the purposes of this project I evaluate a tribunal’s
ability to re-establish rule of law based on two factors. The first factor is a tribunal’s
ability to dismantle institutions that perpetuated or facilitated mass human rights
violations (i.e. government bureaus, media sources distributing propaganda). The second
factor looks at a tribunal’s ability to support the domestic judicial system. This support
can come in many forms, however this project will only assess if a tribunal can ease the
prosecutorial burden placed on a domestic legal system in the wake of mass participation
in human rights violations. The third objective is the creation and distribution of an
accurate historical record. Prosecutorial accountability mechanisms seek to establish this
record through individual accountability and legal redress for victims. The focus on
individuals and criminal prosecutions necessarily leads to an historical record that
provides a legal account of the conflict. Evaluating a tribunal’s success in this area varies
on a case-to-case basis. As my cases will reveal, success usually has a correlation to a
tribunals’ proximity to the most affected population and the successful use of outreach
programs to educate this population about its activities. The final goal I examine is the
desire to deter mass human rights violations from being committed in the future. There
are two types of deterrence: specific deterrence and general deterrence. Specific
3

See: Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, Article 6 of ICTR Statute, Article 6 of SCSL Statute, Article 1 of
ECCC
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deterrence seeks to prevent a specific individual or group, who may have already
committed a crime, from doing so again. General deterrence seeks prevention on a
society-wide level—to deter future atrocities from ever being committed by anyone or
any group.4
The majority of this project draws from secondary sources such as scholarly
journals and academic books. As the literature review will show, these secondary
sources are not exclusive to the disciplines of Political Science, International Relations,
and International Law. Instead, this project is based on research conducted in various
fields and across multiple disciplines. I will also be utilizing official documents issued
by the United Nations, the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, and the Statutes from the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
As is evidenced by the literature, accountability mechanisms demand constant
research by scholars across multiple disciplines. Justice, as a principle and as an
objective sought by accountability mechanisms, deserves study in and of itself. The
complexity of these subjects makes it necessary for me to discuss the scope and
limitations of this project.
This project only examines prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, and will not
touch upon truth and reconciliation commissions or other forms of restorative justice.
The main limitation to this project can be attributed to time constrains and limited
resources. Although I was able to use a wide variety of secondary sources, I did not
conduct field research. This project was conducted during an academic year and the
scope of this project reflects this time constraint. Despite these limitations, the use of two
4

Payam Akhavan, “Justice in the Hague, Peace in the former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United
Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998): 737-816.

12

major case studies and two brief case studies allow me the opportunity to explore the
depth of the subject matter—something that would have been impossible if this project
simply provided a broad overview of all existing prosecutorial accountability
mechanisms.
Outline of argument
The project consists of four parts. Chapter I provides a summary of the extant
literature on accountability mechanisms and justice. This chapter will provide a brief
chronology tracing the development of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. Using
the literature, it will introduce two major themes of justice—restorative justice and
retributive justice. Chapter I will present some of the most important arguments and
opinions on the enforcement of human rights. This chapter will explore one of these
debates in detail. This debate is one that pits peace against justice. This subject is of the
utmost important to this project because this debate arises when tribunals are
implemented in ongoing conflict. Some scholars believe that pursuing justice during
conflict will upset the possibilities for peace; others believe that lasting peace in
unattainable without justice.
Chapter II consists of an in-depth case study of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This case study will advance my argument that the
ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia negatively influenced the ICTY’s
effectiveness. The presence of conflict obstructed the following activities: initiating
investigations; accessing and collective evidence; gathering witness testimony;
apprehending suspects; and engaging with the most affected population. The conflict had
a particularly noticeable influence on the pre-trial phase of the Yugoslav Tribunal. The
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case of the ICTY supports my argument that many of the activities necessary to an
effective tribunal are made considerably more difficult when conducted during conflict
and continued human rights violations.
Chapter III presents a case study of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda. In contradistinction to the ICTY, the Rwanda Tribunal was established in the
aftermath of mass violence. This section of the project demonstrates how the ICTR’s
delayed timing allowed time for certain conditions to arise that proved favorable to the
Tribunal’s operations. Chapter III concludes that in the case of Rwanda, the delayed
timing of the ICTR allowed for the following conditions to arise: the installation of a
stable, cooperative government, and increased security for ICTR staff and personnel. The
stable government in Rwanda facilitated the ICTR’s ability to conduct the following
activities: access and collect evidence; gather witness testimony; ensure the security of
witnesses; and apprehend suspects. However, the case study of the ICTR makes it clear
that implementing a tribunal in the aftermath of violence does not ease all problems. The
ICTR failed to adequately distribute a historical record to the most affected populations,
and it had no measurable deterrent effect. The failings of the ICTR indicate that the
timing of a tribunal does not cause all problems, nor does it solve them.
Chapter IV consists of two brief case studies of hybrid tribunals currently
operating in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) are two examples of
prosecutorial mechanisms with a hybrid structure. These cases show that even in
tribunals established after conflict, structure is important in determining its ability to
achieve the four objectives of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. This chapter
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argues that in the case of hybrid tribunals, structure is more influential than timing in
determining effectiveness. Chapter IV assesses how two aspects of hybrid structure
influence effectiveness. These are: location of the tribunals and the mixed composition
of the tribunals. These two factors offer possible solutions to the problems that continued
to plague the ICTR, even in the absence of conflict. Hybrid tribunals will continue to be
used in the future and thus, the strengths and weaknesses of these tribunals must be
explored. This SCSL and ECCC are two such tribunals deserving of further research.
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Chapter I
Justice and Enforcement:
Accountability Mechanisms and the Debates They Inspire

Introduction
This chapter surveys the literature in this field and reflects on the history, themes,
goals, and debates surrounding accountability mechanisms for mass human rights
violations. The existing literature bridges a multitude of disciplines including but not
limited to Sociology, Political Science, International Relations, International Law,
Philosophy, and Anthropology. In order to limit the scope of this essay and for purposes
of argumentation, I focus on the literature that directly pertains to prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms. Mechanisms in this category put primacy on legal
prosecution through such measures as international and domestic trials. Prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms emphasize individual criminal responsibility and seek an end
to impunity for perpetrators of mass human rights violations. These mechanisms are at
the center of this project. Non-prosecutorial measures such as truth and reconciliation
commissions and national policies of lustration are also part of this broad literature, but
will not be discussed in full.
The literature attributes the rise of accountability mechanisms to three
developments or reactions. The first is the development of international law, specifically
international humanitarian law (IHL). The second was a reaction to the nature and extent
of the abuses perpetrated in places such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The third
is the development of a global human rights movement and the rise of various civil
society groups as the impetus behind accountability mechanisms. A review of the
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chronology shows that the development of the literature often corresponds with the
evolution of accountability mechanisms and changing attitudes, prompted in part by the
United Nations, toward the global protection and advancement of human rights. I begin
with the literature on the Nuremberg Trials, which were instated in 1945 in the wake of
World War II. I then move to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals represented by
the ICTY and ICTR, and follow this discussion with an introduction to the literature on
internationalized domestic (also called ‘hybrid’) tribunals. I conclude with a brief
introduction to the scholarship on the International Criminal Court (ICC), which entered
into force in 2002. This chronology reveals a trend in the literature in which authors
identify two broad themes of justice that are intertwined with the implementation of
accountability mechanisms. These themes are retributive justice and restorative justice.
Engaging with these two themes allows me to situate my extensive study of prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms, within the larger framework of justice.
The final section of this essay introduces a debate within the literature, which
juxtaposes justice and peace. This debate arises when justice mechanisms are employed
during ongoing conflict. Some scholars express concern that the decision to pursue
justice in the midst of conflict will have detrimental effects on peace efforts. Numerous
questions are voiced in relation to this debate. What are the drawbacks of pursuing
justice during ongoing conflict? Alternatively, what are the moral implications of
waiting to pursue justice until after a conflict has ended—by which time many thousands
of people may have been murdered, raped, and tortured? If justice is not pursued in the
face of mass human rights violations, can a society ever recover enough to enjoy lasting
peace? The questions prompted by the debate on the seeming incompatibility of peace
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and justice, are important to the development of this project. I suggest that the existence
of such a debate necessitates an in-depth analysis of how the timing of a tribunal
influences its ability to achieve its objectives. In order to secure justice, accountability
mechanisms require access to evidence and witness testimony. The safety of those
participating in the accountability mechanism must be ensured. The indictees must be
apprehended. Each of these issues and many more are influenced by the circumstance in
which a tribunal is implemented.
The rise of accountability mechanisms
The proliferation of literature surrounding accountability for mass human rights
violations is evidence of a developing, albeit at times uneven, trend in global governance.
In the post Cold War era the ratification of numerous conventions and declarations signal
that many states, influenced by supranational organizations such as the United Nations
(UN), as well as by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and domestic advocacy
groups, are increasingly receptive to the global promotion and protection of human rights.
The extant literature attributes the rise of accountability mechanisms to three key
developments: the development of international law, and international humanitarian law5
(IHL) in particular, broader developments in global governance, and a reaction to the
atrocities committed in places like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
Scholars point out that IHL demands some form of legal remedy for those who

5

The International Committee of the Red Cross provides a definition of IHL. “International humanitarian
law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects
persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of
warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict.”
Available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-factsheet (accessed 23
October, 2008).
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have suffered human rights violations.6 M. Cherif Bassiouni, a prominent scholar and
practitioner in the field of human rights, argues that certain international conventions,
covenants, and declarations that form the base of IHL, impose duties on states to provide
these remedies. He cites the Hague Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of
Land Warfare, The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and others for ensuring that states provide
effective remedy in the wake of human rights abuses.7 Bassiouni writes that it is “well
grounded in the conventional and customary law that a state is under a duty to provide
reparations for its violations of human rights and international humanitarian laws”.8 Some
of the existing literature looks upon treaties with a critical eye—how effective are they in
preventing or promoting human rights, and why are states motivated to sign them?9
Further, why are these treaties gaining more legitimacy with states now, and not earlier?
One author acknowledges, “the average state has ratified a steadily increasing percentage
of available human rights treaties, creating a world space characterized by the rapid and
nearly universal acceptance of international human rights law”.10 The United States

6

Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 100 (June, 1991). 2555-2615. See also: Michael P. Scharf and Nigel
Rodley, “International Law Principles on Accountability,” in Post-Conflict Justice, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni
(Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002): 91. See also: W.J. Fenrick, “International
Humanitarian Law and Criminal Trials,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 7 (Spring, 1997):
23-43.
7
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, in Post-Conflict
Justice, ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002): 44.; Orentlicher,
“Settling Accounts,” 2555-2615.
8
Bassiouni, “Accountability for Violations” in Post-Conflict Justice, 49.
9
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of
Empty Promises,” American Journal of Sociology 110 (March 2005): 1374. See: George Downs, David M.
Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News for Cooperation?”
International Organization 50 (1996): 379-406.
10
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, “Empty Promises,” 2.
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advocated for the creation of the ICTY and many European states are enthusiastic
supporters of the ICC. However, the scholarship on human rights points to other factors
that helped give rise to the human rights movement—the growth in civil society, the new
technologies of media and communication, and supranational organizations such as the
United Nations.
In the past fifteen years, a number of changes have taken place in the structures
of global governance. Most scholars of International Relations now accept that states are
not the sole actors on the international stage. Mary Kaldor defines civil society as
the process through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against or
agree with each other and with the centres of political and economic
authority…global civil society is a platform inhabited by activists…NGOs
and neoliberals, as well as national and religious groups, where they argue
about, campaign for (or against), negotiate about, or lobby for the
arrangements that shape global developments.11
Many of the various actors that comprise civil society choose to focus their activities on
issues pertaining to human rights. Various associations and organizations such as TRIAL
(Track Impunity Always) Watch, the International Crisis Group, Global Policy Forum
and others contribute to advancing international justice issues. These organizations
publish reports on human rights practices in countries around the world, and monitor
reported human rights abuses. Scholars who focus on the changing nature of global
governance also cite the advent of media and technology systems that can instantaneously
transmit news to people all over the world. The global media reports, albeit in varying
degrees, on human rights abuses and opens the door for civil society groups to pressure

11

Mary Kaldor, “The Idea of Global Civil Society,” International Affairs 79 (2003): 590.
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state governments to take action.12 Similarly, bodies within broader supranational
organizations such as the UN13 seek to enforce or advance the norms of international law
that have helped lead to the development of accountability mechanisms. It is accepted in
the literature that without the existence of the UN it is unlikely that the ICTY and ICTR
would have been established. Accountability mechanisms, in all their manifestations,
have benefited from this movement to advance the cause of human rights.
Chronology of accountability mechanisms
Nuremberg Trials
Scholars of international law trace the origins of the present-day accountability
mechanisms to the Nuremberg Trials established in 1945, after the conclusion of World
War II. These trials sought to punish certain German individuals for inciting and waging
a war of aggression, and for crimes against humanity. In the existing literature it is rare
that Nuremberg is not at least mentioned in an examination of contemporary justiceseeking measures. 14 Ruti Teitel argues that the Nuremberg Trials established a legacy
that continues to influence prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. She calls attention
to two crucial contributions: the introduction of the principle of individual accountability
into international law, and the overarching ideal of criminal justice on an international
level.15 The Nuremberg Trials’ indictment of Nazi leaders marked a shift from a legal
paradigm that largely focused on collective accountability, toward a system that placed
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guilt on individual perpetrators. Additionally, Nuremberg set a precedent for trials of
individuals on the international stage. Of central importance to future accountability
mechanisms was the designation of crimes against humanity—a new type of crime that
was created in the context of the Nuremberg Trials.16 In an article written in 1949,
immediately after the conclusion of the Nuremberg Trials, Hans Ehard references the
final judgment. He states, “[t]he responsibility of individuals under international law is
affirmed by the court. In its opinion international law imposes duties and liabilities upon
individuals as well as upon states”.17 Although it was not explicitly articulated at the
time, much of the existing literature argues that the Nuremberg Trials advanced the idea
that some crimes are so heinous that their perpetrators should be prosecuted regardless of
where the crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. Today, jus
cogens crimes are those that “threaten the peace and security of humankind…[and] shock
the conscience of humanity”.18 The norms of jus cogens are non-derogable. Crimes of
jus cogens include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and others.
Unfortunately, although the Nuremberg Trials were heralded as a major step toward
accountability for these crimes, another trial of its kind would not take place until 1993,
forty-four years after the end of Nuremberg.
Ad hoc international criminal trials
International criminal tribunals were implemented in the 1990s in the aftermath of
massive human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. As the first of their
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kind they justifiably are given substantial attention in the literature. The ICTY and ICTR
emerged from the tradition of the Nuremberg Trials but their objectives are specifically
focused on enforcing human rights through legal punishment of perpetrators. The
literature examining the creation and function of these trials runs the gamut from those
scholars that praise the achievements of these trials, to those that condemn both as
inefficient, expensive tools created to assuage the guilt of states that did nothing to
prevent the atrocities the ICTY and ICTR seek to condemn.19 I provide a brief
background of both the ICTY and ICTR and introduce major debates in the literature.
The ICTY was established in 1993, by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) under powers granted it by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As a result of the
continued hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, the court was located in The Hague, in the
Netherlands. The ICTR, established by the UNSC in 1994 in response to the genocide in
Rwanda in which approximately 800,000 people were killed, was created as a result of
the precedent set by the ICTY.20 The literature abounds with critical evaluations of the
these two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, but there is consensus that both were
essential in creating and advancing legal precedents that continue to shape the use of
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms.21 Rape as a war crime and the prosecution of
incumbent heads of state are but two examples that continue to affect contemporary
approaches to international criminal justice. However, the literature points out that

19

Kenneth A. Rodman, “Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence,” Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008):
534.
20
Payam Akhavan, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment”, The American Journal of International Law 90 (July, 1996): 501. See also: Martha Minow,
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1998). 34.
21
Kritz, “Progress and Humility,” 55-88.

23

despite certain important contributions, both the ICTY and ICTR are not without faults.22
Three issues are the most frequently discussed: the politicized nature of the ICTY and
ICTR, their ability to fairly and efficiently execute justice, and their lack of engagement
with the people most affected by the atrocities. The debates surrounding these three
issues have been central to shaping the development of new types of accountability
mechanisms.
Due to the Tribunals’ connections to the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), many scholars identify the ICTY and ICTR as political devices that were
created first and foremost to relieve pressure to act (in the case of the ICTY), or guilt at
inaction (ICTR).23 This assertion is fleshed out in the literature in various ways.
Scholars focus on the often-contradictory role that Western powers took in dealing with
conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia—there were public denunciations of
the crimes committed but a strong resistance to any decisive action to stop such
violence.24 In the case of Rwanda it is frequently argued that the creation of the ICTR
was a largely empty concession in the aftermath of a genocide that the world did nothing
to stop.25 Scholars’ criticisms of the ICTY cite its lack of enforcement capability as a
major weakness to its potential effectiveness. Richard Goldstone, a former Chief
Prosecutor for the ICTY refutes this argument. He writes that the issue of enforcement
was not a failure of the ICTY itself. Rather, the general “lack of political will on the part
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of leading Western nations to support and enforce the orders of the tribunal” severely
curtailed its ability to successfully pursue justice.26
Scholars who study the ICTY and ICTR also grapple with the tribunals’ ability to
execute justice. High operational costs and lack of efficiency have been raised as major
concerns that existing tribunals continue to struggle with.27 The scholarship also laments
the gap between the geographic location of the tribunals and the population that suffered
the crimes being prosecuted. Scholars who debate the effectiveness of the ICTY raise
concern that its physical distance from the scene and victims of the abuses has impeded
the successful operation of the court.28 Global and local media have joined scholars in
drawing attention to the perceived disengagement between the courts and the people that
suffered the atrocities.29
As evidenced by the debates mentioned above, both the ICTY and ICTR are
complex structures with numerous shortcomings. Interestingly, it is likely that
scholarship detailing the (in)effectiveness of these ad hoc tribunals has led those who
advocate for accountability mechanisms to attempt to address some of these weaknesses.
The shortcomings of the ICTY and ICTR helped pave the way for developments in the
structure of prosecutorial mechanisms. The most recently established prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia, attempt to
address some of the failings of the ad hoc tribunals that preceded them.
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Hybrid tribunals
Hybrid tribunals are the most recent development in prosecutorial accountability
mechanisms. The structure of such tribunals is evidence of a move to address the
weaknesses of the ICTY and ICTR. Sierra Leone,30 East Timor,31 and Cambodia32 are
three of the few places where hybrid courts have been implemented. The literature on
hybrid courts continues to develop along with new indictments and charges issued by the
existing hybrid tribunals. Scholars see potential for these courts to improve on some of
the shortcomings that were evident in the ICTY and ICTR. Much of the literature on
hybrid tribunals details their strengths and weaknesses in relation to the tribunals
implemented before them.33 Proponents of hybrid courts argue that there are two main
advantages to this structure: the ability for the hybrid court to better domestic legal and
judicial systems that may have been destroyed during a conflict, and a hybrid court’s
proximity to the affected population.34 Advocates of hybrid tribunals suggest that the
mixed composition of local and international judges could potentially correct worries of
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Western powers’ dominance over court proceedings, a concern which plagued the ICTY
and ICTR.35
In large part, scholars of transitional justice and human rights seem optimistic
about the possible successes of these hybrid tribunals. Lower costs, proximity to affected
population, and involvement of both local and international parties, are cited as positive
steps in the creation of effective mechanisms for accountability.36 The literature that
articulates concerns about the hybrid courts suggests that hybrid models based in the
country where atrocities occurred could be too easily politicized and/or manipulated by
domestic groups. It is also suggested that without reliable international funding support
these courts may find themselves without the money needed to achieve full
effectiveness.37 Importantly, scholars note that while hybrid courts may address some of
the weaknesses revealed in the functioning of the ICTY and ICTR, problems of delayed
implementation and general operational efficiency are still unsolved. The inability of the
international community to quickly respond to human rights atrocities through
implementation of accountability mechanisms is cited as a major impediment to ending a
culture of impunity. This is in part why the International Criminal Court has been
advocated for and supported by various human rights organizations, scholars, and states.
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International Criminal Court
A wide swath of the literature on the enforcement of human rights argues that
with the entry into force of the International Criminal Court38 on 1 July 2002, the dreams
of a truly functional international criminal justice system were realized. Proponents
argue that a permanent court solves issues of delayed implementation—it is an
established court with the resources and expertise necessary to issue indictments of
human rights violators as they occur. Of course, the opinions of those who oppose the
ICC are also evident in the literature. Two articles best represent the most heated debate
in the literature surrounding the ICC: Henry Kissinger’s “The Pitfalls of Universal
Jurisdiction” ,39 and Kenneth Roth’s response titled, “The Case for Universal
Jurisdiction”.40 Henry Kissinger’s now-famous article outlines the dangers that the ICC
holds. Kissinger cites the ICC’s universal jurisdiction over individuals and the ability for
hostile states to use this breadth of jurisdiction for political maneuverings. He labels this
as a threat to powerful nations (read, the United States) whose service-members are
stationed all over the world and who are thus more likely to be prosecuted by the ICC.
Kenneth Roth’s article refutes all of Kissinger’s main points but focuses specifically on
the built-in checks-and-balances that the ICC includes. Roth asserts that nationals of
powerful countries are not more susceptible to prosecution because the ICC statute allows
domestic courts the first chance to prosecute perpetrators in lieu of a trial held by the
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ICC.41 Kissinger and Roth are not the only two people to confront this debate. The
literature abounds with variations on this discussion. Most notably, scholars focus on the
US opposition to the ICC and the potentially devastating effect this has on its future.
According to much of the literature on the ICC, the court has been stymied in its
efforts in large part because of the United States’ opposition and active attempt to
undermine the ICC.42 The position taken by the US threatens the ability for the ICC to
successfully carry out indictments against perpetrators of mass human rights violations.
Scholars argue that crimes of this nature become more difficult to prosecute when
powerful nations oppose mechanisms such as the ICC. This debate will continue to
develop as the ICC pursues its first indictments and becomes a more established actor in
the enforcement of human rights. Despite such setbacks in some circles enthusiasm for
the ICC has not been dampened and its existence as the first and only permanent court of
its time stands as a testimony to the efforts of various groups, individuals, and states. It
remains to be seen how it will affect the progressive development of international
criminal justice in the coming years.
The chronology of accountability mechanisms provided in the previous
paragraphs is not exhaustive. Numerous countries, most notably in Latin America, have
turned to accountability mechanisms in the wake of human rights abuses. However, the
majority of mechanisms employed in Latin America are of a non-prosecutorial nature.
Measures to end impunity and provide relief for victims come in many different forms.
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Most scholars categorize accountability mechanisms according to the form of justice to
which they most closely follow. The Nuremberg Trials, ad hoc international criminal
tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and the ICC are all most closely associated with retributive
justice. Truth commissions, national lustration policies, and culturally specific
approaches to reconciliation are categorized as examples of restorative justice.
Retributive justice and restorative justice are not mutually exclusive, but they do differ
somewhat in their emphasis and objectives.
Restorative and retributive justice
Accountability mechanisms come in many forms, but the ones most frequently
identified in the literature are truth and reconciliation commissions and international trials
such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There is a consensus in the literature
that two broad types of justice encompass these different types of accountability
mechanisms: retributive justice and restorative justice. Retributive justice refers to a type
of justice that underscores legal proceedings and punishments. Retributive justice is
concerned with placing guilt on individuals and taking the appropriate measures to
prosecute them.43 This latter category of justice operates under the belief that in order to
move forward the past must be recognized and properly addressed. Prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms advance what Darryl Robinson calls a “climate of
accountability”.44 In Martha Minow’s seminal book Between Vengeance and
Forgiveness, she contends that retributive justice in its purest form “insists on
punishment not necessarily in search of deterrence or any other future effects, but instead
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as a way of denouncing previous wrongs and giving persons their deserts”.45 Minow
makes a valid point in this observation on pure retributive justice, yet it does not
completely apply to the contemporary use of accountability mechanisms. Today,
proponents of international criminal justice articulate specific objectives that the ideal
accountability mechanism would accomplish. Deterrence, strengthening of weakened
domestic legal systems, and acknowledgment of the past are but a few of these goals.46
Although contemporary prosecutorial mechanisms are increasingly concerned
with issues of societal reconciliation, it is restorative justice that is focused primarily on
the needs of the victim and the restoration of society. Restorative justice measures
acknowledge the past but ultimately seek to relieve some of the pain and suffering
victims have endured.47 This category of justice emphasizes reconciliation and a desire
to move forward after atrocities have been committed—these goals are privileged over
the desire to punish perpetrators for crimes committed. Proponents of restorative justice
mechanisms often urge their use in situations where internal conflict has occurred
between two or more groups of people (ethnic, religious, or otherwise). It is argued that
in such situations it is more important for societies to acknowledge the truth of what
happened, and then move forward, than it is to focus on the past and punish
perpetrators.48 The most prominent scholars who study human rights and international
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criminal justice identify truth and/or reconciliation commissions (TRCs) as the type of
accountability mechanism that best fits the category of restorative justice.49 The
restorative nature of TRCs resides in their ability to create an official record of the truth.
In ideal circumstances these TRCs operate at the site of the atrocities and with the
participation of local populations.50 TRCs have been used in South Africa51 in the years
after apartheid, and in the aftermath of conflicts in El Salvador, Argentina, and now in
Sierra Leone and Liberia.52
It is important to note that when applied to accountability mechanisms these broad
themes of justice rarely operate in exclusive realms. Rather, most accountability
mechanisms, prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial alike, combine retributive justice with a
desire for reconciliation and redress for victims. Neil J. Kritz, a prominent scholar of
transitional justice states,
Societies shattered by the perpetration of atrocities need to adapt or design
mechanisms to confront their demons, to reckon with these past abuses.
Otherwise, for nations, as for individuals, the past will haunt and infect the
present and future in unpredictable ways. The assumption that individuals
or groups who have been the victims of hideous atrocities will simply
forget about them or expunge their feelings without some form of
accounting, some semblance of justice, is to leave in place the seeds of
future conflict.53
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Kritz’ scholarship notes the diverse range of goals that accountability mechanisms often
seek. These goals include: the pursuit of individual criminal accountability, deterrence of
future crimes, and a forum through which the past can be documented and acknowledged.
In recent years however, a debate has arisen over whether the desire for justice and the
subsequent use of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, has come at the detriment of
peace and lasting stability.54 The use of accountability mechanisms in cases of human
rights abuses is being employed more frequently as human rights advocates, legal
practitioners, and scholars argue for its legitimate and important contribution to ending
impunity. This debate concerning peace, justice, and accountability mechanisms must be
confronted if these mechanisms are to remain a respected tool in international criminal
justice.
Peace and Justice
When a society has been torn apart by large-scale violence and death that is often
perpetrated by one subset of society against another, an end to the conflict is crucially
important and much desired. The literature on accountability mechanisms and
transitional justice has reflected a normative dilemma that began to be raised in the
context of the ICTY. This debate centers on the seeming tension between the need to
establish peace and the desire to pursue justice. Two different viewpoints dominate this
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exchange: 1) sustainable peace cannot be achieved without the successful pursuit of
justice; 2) the pursuit of justice will damage the possibilities for lasting peace.
In the existing literature certain scholars fiercely advocate for legal accountability
for perpetrators of mass human rights violations.55 They argue that there can be no
sustainable peace if justice is not sought. Bassiouni, a leading proponent of justice in all
circumstances, argues “justice is far too often bartered away for political settlements…the
practice of impunity has become the political price paid to secure an end to the violence
of ongoing conflicts”.56 The victims, he suggests, are the ones that suffer the
consequences of this politically expedient exchange. Other scholars join Bassiouni in
criticizing those that would forgo justice in order to obtain peace.57 They argue that
prosecutions can provide an important account of past or ongoing events, and serve to
strengthen the domestic judicial systems. Additionally, “[h]olding the violators
accountable for their acts is a duty owed to the victims both living and dead”.58 Of
foremost importance to these scholars, is their argument that in the long term, peace
cannot be maintained if justice is not pursued.
On the other side of the debate are those that see justice as a possible impediment
to the cessation of violence and the achievement of peace. This side is frequently
identified as a pragmatist or realist conception of accountability for human rights abuses.
Richard Goldstone, although he does not adhere to this side of the debate, provides a
helpful summary of this position. He states that those who believe that justice could
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derail peace are concerned with “the political expediency and morality of pursuing such
justice during the life span of an ongoing conflict at the apparent expense of a negotiated
peace and the lives of further innocent victims.”59 A pragmatic examination of
accountability mechanisms warns that such measures could undermine stability and/or
incite retaliation by the groups who are most likely to face prosecution.60 In direct
contrast to Bassiouni’s assertions mentioned above, pragmatists contend that
“[p]reventing atrocities and enhancing respect for the law will frequently depend on
striking politically expedient bargains that create effective political coalitions to contain
the power of potential perpetrators of abuses”.61 Scholars that write from this position
argue that indictments against existing heads of state could ignite increased hostilities in
situations already fraught with tension, ill will, and mistrust. Much of the literature
representative of this side of the debate advances the idea that limited amnesties for
prosecutors of human rights violations are sometimes necessary for the establishment and
preservation of peace.62 Of course, not all scholars who confront this debate choose a
clear-cut side. Occasionally a scholar will resist the strict justice versus peace
dichotomy.63 Considering the complexity of situations where mass human rights
atrocities have been committed, this position seems wise.
Given the ever-changing nature of world politics, the literature on justice and the
mechanisms used to achieve justice must be constantly updated. The literature must also
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strive to explore these complicated judicial organs from every possible angle. This
project contributes to the literature by providing analysis of how the timing of a tribunal
influences its effectiveness. Thus far, scholarship on tribunals has not provided a
comprehensive assessment of how the circumstances in which a tribunal is established
may impact its ability to achieve its objectives. By conducting in-depth case studies of
existing tribunals, this project hopes to provide analysis that will help in the future
development of tribunals that operate more efficiently and effectively.
Conclusion
In this overview of the literature on prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, I
have confronted the dominant themes and debates that are present in this area of study.
However, I do not find the scholarship pertaining to the peace and justice debate fully
satisfying. I argue that if a tribunal is established during conflict, the challenges of
achieving justice become more acute. In turn, implementing a tribunal in the aftermath of
mass violence allows certain favorable conditions to arise. The timing of tribunals is an
important factor to consider, especially in light of the recent indictments issued by the
ICC. The recent indictment issued for Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the President of Sudan,
indicates that with the existence of the ICC accountability mechanisms will be more
frequently implemented in situations of ongoing conflict. If this is indeed true, it is
essential that scholars and actors in the field of human rights consider how pursuing
justice in the midst of ongoing conflict can impact its effectiveness.
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Chapter II: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Complicating the Pursuit of Justice:
Ongoing Conflict and its Influence on the ICTY

Introduction
Nearly a half-century after the Nuremberg Trials of 1945-46, which riveted the
world’s attention on war crimes and retributive justice, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created to bring to justice those
responsible for the numerous atrocities committed during the conflicts that raged in the
splintering Yugoslav Republic throughout the 1990s. It is estimated that over 200,000
lives were lost in the conflict.64 Created in 1993, the ICTY is scheduled to conclude
proceedings in 2010. Many criticisms have been leveled at the ICTY, yet the tribunal has
also garnered praise for taking steps to replace a “culture of impunity” with a “culture of
accountability”65. As a prosecutorial accountability mechanism, the ICTY has four
objectives: to pursue individual criminal accountability; to create and disseminate an
accurate historical record; to re-establish rule of law; to deter future atrocities. The ICTY
was established in the midst of ongoing conflict. I argue that the decision to implement
the Tribunal during conflict negatively affected the ability of the ICTY to achieve its four
objectives. This case study suggests that the effectiveness of the ICTY suffered due to the
fact that it was implemented and operated during active conflict.
The timing of the Tribunal made the already numerous challenges of pursuing
justice even more acute. The presence of conflict hindered the ability for the ICTY to
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achieve the following goals: the creation and distribution of an accurate historical record
and the re-establishment of rule of law. Specifically, the ongoing conflict produced onthe-ground conditions, which negatively influence the Tribunal’s ability to do the
following: ensure the physical security of staff, personnel, and witnesses; collect
evidence; gather witness testimony; apprehend suspects; and access the most affected
population (i.e. the people who suffered, witnessed, and participated in the atrocities).
The ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia made the activities necessary for an
effective tribunal, difficult to complete. The timing of the ICTY also dictated its physical
location. Due to active conflict, the ICTY is based in The Hague, the Netherlands. The
physical distance from the former Yugoslavia hindered the ICTY’s efforts to educate the
local populations about the proceedings and developments of the Tribunal. Although the
successes and failures of the ICTY are not entirely reducible to its having been
established in the midst of the conflict, this case study indicates that there is a correlation
between the two.
The decision to implement the ICTY while atrocities were ongoing led to a heated
debate on the goals of peace and justice—goals that some viewed as being mutually
exclusive. Two sides to the debate emerged. One side argued that only by pursuing
justice would there be lasting peace. On the other side were those who worried that by
pursuing justice in the context of ongoing conflict, the chances of a peace agreement
would be diminished. A justice mechanism could de-rail the peace process and lead to
more deaths. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was one of the first situations where
the apparent tensions between peace and justice were publicly recognized and discussed.
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The ICTY is a significant development in the field of international criminal law,
and has appropriately received much academic attention. Thus far however, scholars
have not adequately addressed how the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia
influenced the effectiveness of the ICTY. Part of this chapter analyzes the difficulties of
the ICTY in terms of the aforementioned debate on peace and justice. I begin this chapter
with an overview of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Next, I examine the process
that led to the creation of the ICTY, its basic structure, composition, and mandate. I
engage with the debate that arose over the pursuit of justice in the midst of conflict.
Before providing a complete analysis of the ongoing conflict’s influence on the ICTY
ability to achieve its four goals, I present the judicial proceedings thus far. This will help
establish the foundation upon which I will examine the Tribunal’s successes and failures
in achieving individual criminal accountability, rule of law, an historical record, and a
deterrent effect.
History of the Conflict
After World War II, Yugoslavia consisted of six republics established by leader
Josip Tito: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia66, and
Slovenia. A number of ethnic groups were represented in—Albanians, Bosniacs (Bosnian
Muslims), Croats, Hungarians, Roma, Jews, Serbs, Slovenes and more. After Tito’s death
in 1980, the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia began to push for greater autonomy and
possible independence. In response, Serbian leaders who opposed this goal began to
consolidate Serbian power over Yugoslavia as a whole.
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In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAAS) issued a
memorandum that attacked the Yugoslavian constitution and suggested that Tito
discriminated against Serbs during his time in power. The memorandum accused Tito of
engaging in “physical, political, legal and cultural genocide against the Serb population in
Kosovo”.67 The SAAS Memorandum argued that Serbian interests should be pursued by
any means necessary. During this time Serb-nationalism reached a peak, due in large part
to the Serbian elite who used a massive propaganda campaign to stoke the fires of ethnic
hatred.68 Later the same year, Slobodan Milošević became the chief of the Serbian
Communist Party. Tensions between the Serbian nationalist government and the
Republics of Croatia and Slovenia reached a breaking point.
On 25 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Milošević,
now the President of the Republic of Serbia, cited the importance of protecting the Serb
populations in these regions. With the help of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army (JNA),
Milošević began a political and military campaign to stop the secession and consolidate
Serb power. In November of 1991, Serbian forces occupying the Croatian town of
Vukovar massacred 200 patients in a local hospital and deposited their bodies in a mass
grave. Despite the threat of invasion by Serb forces and insurgents, the Bosniac and
Croatian populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence on 1 March 1992.
Shortly after this declaration, the independent nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was
recognized by the European Community and the United States (US).69 The Serbian
attack on Croatian and Bosniac populations that followed this recognition is now
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acknowledged to be a pre-planned campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Serb
peoples.
As the crisis in the former Yugoslavia continued members of the Security Council
came under pressure to act. News stations around the world reported on the human rights
violations being committed in the disintegrating Yugoslav state.70 Human rights
organizations and advocacy groups monitored the situation and used the information to
try to force a response from the international community. No UN member-state that was
ignorant of the events that were occurring in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, in the early
phases the international community did little to bring about an end to the conflict.
Michael Scharf and Paul Williams identify two phases in the international
community’s response. The first lasted from the beginning of the conflict until early
1995. This phase was categorized by actions that amounted to accommodation.71 Scharf
and Williams identify the second phase, which began in the spring of 1995 and helped
pave the way for the Dayton Negotiations, as one in which accommodation was replaced
with forceful intervention.72 UN resolutions meant to stem the fighting—and perhaps
dilute international pressure to act forcefully—were adopted throughout the initial phase
of accommodation.73 In the following sections I present the debates and decisions within
the UN on the appropriate reaction to the Yugoslav conflict. Other scholarly work
provides in-depth analysis of the discussions that led up to the creation of the ICTY. I
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introduce them briefly. My intention is not to saddle the international community with
blame for its inaction. Rather, I hope to demonstrate how the UN decisions made during
this period, do not exist in isolation from the debate on balancing the need for peace with
the desire for justice.
When fighting broke out in 1991, the United States had lost interest in
Yugoslavia. After the end of the Cold War the country was no longer viewed as
strategically important and so the United States was content to let European states handle
the situation. Throughout the early stages, the U.S. excused their inaction as the
appropriate response to a conflict that involved the equal participation of both sides.
Scharf and Williams explain that this position allowed the United States to avoid direct
action. This in spite of the fact that by mid 1995 it was well known that the majority of
the ethnic cleansing was being carried out by nationalist Serbs.74
The US was not the only member of the international community to delay action.
The United Kingdom (UK) and other European states also participated in this initial
phase of accommodation. A series of joint UN and European Union (EU) peace processes
were attempted from 1992 until late 1994, but by then it was clear that attempts at peace
had failed.75 Paul Williams and Patricia Taft suggest that these failures resulted from
several interacting factors. First, differences of opinion in the EU meant that coordination
was difficult to achieve. Second, the administrations in the US and EU were not eager to
pump mass amounts of money and resources into ending a conflict, which at least
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initially did not provide a direct threat to Western nations. Deploying troops to the region
and risking causalities was not viewed as a politically viable option.76 Instead, the EU and
US relied on ad hoc decision making processes that stood-in for military action. Initial
efforts to end the conflict also included a legitimization of key players in the conflict—
most notably Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić .77 The willingness on the part
of the international community to engage in peace talks with these men suggests that
leaders in the US and UK thought that these negotiations would constitute a valid path to
peace.78 Including Milošević and Karadžić in high-level diplomatic talks also indicate
just how desperately the UK and US sought to avoid the use of force. Former George
H.W. Bush Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman, argues that Western states were largely
apathetic to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Zimmerman posits that Western-led
negotiations led “to a kind of cynical theater, a pretence of useful activity, a way of
disguising a lack of will. Diplomacy without force became an unloaded weapon,
impotent and ridiculous.”79 As Western powers attempted to secure a political peace, the
UN took action in the form of Security Council resolutions. These resolutions spanned
the breadth of four years and culminated in the establishment of an ad hoc international
tribunal—the ICTY.
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On 20 May 1992 UNSC Resolution 757 was passed. This Resolution called for a
trade embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in an attempt to force an
end to Serbian interference in Bosnia. After this proved ineffective the UNSC issued
Resolution 770 in August of 1992, which authorized governments to take “all measures
necessary” to ensure that aid safely reached the Bosnian population.80 This was followed
by Resolution 781, which established a no-fly zone over Bosnia. After much political
posturing, the UNSC adopted Resolution 808 on 22 February 1993. This resolution
marked the decision to create an international tribunal—what would become the ICTY.81
A little over a month later, UNSC Resolution 819 declared the city of Srebrenica
a safe-area on 16 April 1993. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),
established earlier in February 1992,82 was assigned the task of overseeing the
demilitarized safe-areas, which had been expanded to include the cities of Sarajevo,
Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac. However, UNPROFOR was not permitted to use force
and when Serb forces under the command of Ratko Mladić attacked the safe-areas in
mid-July 1995, UNPROFOR retreated and thousands of civilians were massacred. It is
estimated that over 8,000 Muslim boys and men were murdered in the twelve-day period
when Serbian forces occupied Srebrenica.83 Media attention increased in the wake of the
massacre, and more and more people around the world were made aware of the reported
abuses. These atrocities included “mass forced population transfers of Bosniacs,
organized massacres and the physical destruction of whole towns, the systematic and
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repeated rape of thousands of Bosniac women and young girls, and the existence of over
400 Serb-run detention centers.”84
The policy of accommodation had clearly failed to deter the Serbs from
continuing their campaign of violence. The Srebrenica massacre and the continued Serb
occupation of parts of Croatia, led to the use of force as a viable political option.
Williams and Scharf explain that the US policy reversal was prompted by “the continuing
atrocities and the intense public criticism of a failed policy”.85 On 30 August 1995, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization86 (NATO) launched air strikes against Serbian targets
as part of Operation Deliberate Force.87 The NATO air strikes are generally regarded as
the impetus for Serbian agreement to meet in Dayton, Ohio to discuss a peace accord.
Unfortunately, the Dayton negotiations resulted in a peace that marginalized justice.
Serbian interests, represented by Slobodan Milošević, were prioritized in an attempt to
achieve a cease-fire.88 One of the major decisions resulting from the Dayton Accords was
the division of Bosnia into two sections: Republika Srpska, a Serb stronghold, and the
Bosniac-Croat Federation.89 The Dayton Accords and their poor implementation over the
months following the negotiations resulted in a shaky peace.90 Three years after the
Dayton Accords, Serbian forces entered Kosovo and began a campaign of ethnic
cleansing against the non-Serb population. “Retaliatory and armed action, torture and ill-
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treatment, arbitrary detention, forced disappearances, harassment and discriminatory
treatment [were] widely reported.”91
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Resolution 808 stated the need for an international tribunal that “would contribute
to the restoration and maintenance of peace”.92 This tribunal became a reality in May of
1993 when UN Security Council Resolution 827 established the International Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).93 This Resolution expressed concern over the reported
atrocities and declared the UN’s intent to create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal
to try those responsible for the commission of violations of human rights. The ICTY
became the first tribunal since the Nuremberg Trials to prosecute individuals for
violations of international humanitarian law.94 Many people in the human rights
community regard the creation of the ICTY as a momentous occasion. There was hope
that justice would be rendered and a respect for human rights enforced. The ICTY was
created using Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter. These powers allow the UN to
call on member states to take the necessary measures “to maintain or restore international
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peace and security.”95 In theory, Chapter VII powers make it obligatory for states to fully
cooperate with the Tribunal. States must provide any and all relevant evidence to
facilitate investigations. Third party states also have a responsibility to apprehend
Tribunal indictees and extradite them to The Hague for prosecution. In practice however,
the ICTY has no enforcement power so this cooperation is requisite in theory only. The
ICTY marked the first instance in which Chapter VII powers were invoked in the creation
of an international tribunal.96 The Tribunal also enjoys primacy over national courts.
The ICTY Statute was adopted on 25 May 1993. The ongoing conflict in
Yugoslavia was influential from the very beginning. The continuing violence prompted
the UN to seat the ICTY in The Hague, the Netherlands. This decision is evidence that
even before the ICTY began proceedings, the ongoing conflict was already influencing
key decisions such as location of the Tribunal. The first four Articles in the Statute for the
ICTY gives the court jurisdiction over four categories of crimes that violate international
law. These include: 1) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 194997, 2)
violations of the laws or customs of war98, 3) genocide99, and 4) crimes against
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humanity100. The prosecutorial power of the ICTY resides in its jurisdiction over
individuals—specifically those “most responsible” for the aforementioned crimes.
Article 7(2) establishes prosecutorial jurisdiction over incumbent heads of state. Article
7(3) establishes command responsibility and Article 7(4) states that the ‘obedience to
orders’ defense will not relieve the individual of criminal responsibility. The ICTY’s
temporal jurisdiction mandates it to investigate and prosecute those crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Article 32 of the Statute ensures that funding for the
Court is provided through the General Assembly’s annual budget.101
The Tribunal was created in 1993, but it was not until the 26 April 1995 that the
first trial commenced. The early years of the ICTY were spent in preparation for the
huge task that loomed before it. A Chief Prosecutor and judges had to be chosen, staff
hired, materials prepared, statute drafted. This was made more complicated by the
politics inherent to such a process. UN member-states campaigned for their own national
historic monuments, plunder of public or private property. Article 3 makes note that violations of the laws
or customs of war includes but is not limited to the aforementioned actions.
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judges to be selected and they protested the nomination of others.102 It was not until 6
April 1994, that the War Crimes Commission, comprised of experts selected to gather
information and provide documentation to the ICTY, submitted its full report. The
report, along with all its annexes, totaled over 3,300 pages of detailed information on the
crimes that occurred, suspected perpetrators, and more.103
As a prosecutorial accountability mechanism, the ICTY’s objectives include: to
pursue individual criminal responsibility; to re-establish rule of law; to create and
distribute an accurate historical record; and to deter future crimes. However, before these
objectives could be pursued, the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia prompted a
debate that pitted justice and peace against one another.
Peace, Justice, and the ICTY
The ICTY’s goals centered on the pursuit of justice, but it was also “set up as a
mechanism for the restoration of peace while the conflict continued to rage in the former
Yugoslavia.”104 Because the conflict was labeled a “threat to international peace and
security” the Tribunal was expected to both pursue justice and contribute to the peace
process.105 This enhanced mandate coupled with the ICTY’s status as an UN-created
mechanism made it essential that it “strictly [adhere] to the requirements of impartiality
and fairness”.106 The complex relationship between peace and justice emerged as a
prominent debate amongst those who study transitional justice and accountability
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mechanisms. Early in the process (before the Tribunal itself was created) it became
apparent that not everyone agreed that peace and justice were complementary goals. In
fact, many of those involved in initial negotiations to end the conflict, viewed the creation
of an international tribunal as a serious threat to the peace-process.
In initial deliberations about the practicality of an international tribunal, two main
opinions were expressed regarding the tenuous balance between peace and justice. Both
opinions were inextricably linked to the timing of the proposed ICTY. On one side were
those arguing that any tribunal established during conflict would face possibly
insurmountable obstacles. Further, to pursue justice at such a time could lead to a
collapse in the peace process or worse yet, an incitement to violence. Many of those
involved with the ongoing peace processes were particularly concerned that any Security
Council approved attempt at justice would signal the immediate end to negotiations.107
Richard Goldstone summarizes this argument,
How…could one expect that such leaders [Milošević and Karadžić] would
negotiate a peace agreement when one of the consequences of that
agreement would be their prosecution and possible life imprisonment for
war crimes?108
Those who feared the breakdown of negotiations were hesitant to establish an
international tribunal at such a critical point in the conflict. This is not to say that those
who were proponents of this position were against justice. Rather, this position held that
justice should be temporarily delayed in order to ensure that a peace agreement was
successfully reached.109
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Those who represented the opposing opinion sought to impress upon the Security
Council that without justice there would be no lasting peace. Proponents of this view
argued for the immediate implementation of an international tribunal such as the ICTY.
Those on this side of the debate argued that justice would help lead to and maintain peace
for two main reasons: justice counters impunity and contributes to the deterrence of
future atrocities. The initiation of a judicial process would signal to the perpetrators of
mass atrocities that the international community was serious about enforcing human
rights. Additionally, adherents of this position hoped that the pursuit of justice would
have a lasting deterrent effect. Akhavan explains, “unchecked atrocities against civilians
send the message to potential aggressors elsewhere that they can commit such crimes
with impunity…thus encouraging or even providing an incentive to resort to large-scale
violence as an instrument of attaining power.”110 This side of the debate argued that
without a serious attempt at justice, any peace that was achieved would be temporary and
ultimately inconsequential. The debate prompted by the possibility of a tribunal indicates
that the ongoing conflict prompted concern, even before the creation of the ICTY. Once
the ICTY was established, its timing continued to impact its ability to achieve its four
objectives.
Judicial Proceedings
Since its creation in 1993, the ICTY has indicted over 161 persons for committing
serious violations of international humanitarian law.111 As of 11 February 2009, there are
45 ongoing proceedings. Goran Hadžić and Ratko Mladić both remain at large. Only six
of the 161 accused remain at a pretrial stage. Excluding these five cases, all trials are set
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to conclude by the end of 2009.112 To date, approximately 70 percent of all indictees are
Bosnian Serbs, 20 percent Croats, and the rest a mix of Bosniacs, Albanians, and
Macedonians. It follows that the majority of convictions have been issued for crimes
committed against (in large part) Bosniacs by Bosnian Serbs.
This section provides an overview of the most important judicial proceedings of
the ICTY. I begin by discussing the early years of the Tribunal, a time period that was
mainly preparatory. I then discuss several key trials. I focus on Duško Tadić, Slobodan
Milošević, Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. After an introduction to these notable
cases I conclude by specifying issues that have affected the judicial proceedings of the
ICTY. I mention several factors such as a delayed start to investigations and a lack of
enforcement power, but I argue that the ongoing conflict in the region proved the greatest
influence on the overall effectiveness of the Tribunal. I introduce this assertion at the end
of this section and begin the next section with a full analysis of timing’s influence on the
ICTY’s effectiveness.
The first indictment of the ICTY was issued for Dragan Nikolic on 4 November
1994. Nikolic was the first person to be indicted, but Duško Tadić, a low-level
perpetrator, was the first to be tried.113 Tadić’s trial was significant not only because of
its historic nature as the ICTY’s first, but also because the Tadić trial helped develop a
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context in which his and others’ crimes could be viewed.114 It also revealed two potential
drawbacks to the ICTY, namely the cost of the trial, which totaled approximately $20
million and the lengthy proceedings, which concluded over a year after it had started.115
Slobodan Milošević is without doubt the name that calls forth the bloodiest
images of the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo. Milošević was President of Serbia from 26
December 1990 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 15 July 1997
until 6 October 2000. He was implicated in horrific crimes committed in Kosovo, Bosnia
Herzegovina and Croatia. Despite the overwhelming evidence linking Milošević to
crimes committed against non-Serb populations, he was not indicted by the ICTY until 24
May 1999—nearly six years after the Tribunal was established.116 In spite of this delay,
the indictment and corresponding arrest of Milošević on 1 April 2001, was viewed by
many as a defining moment for the ICTY. Michael Scharf suggests that
[a]lthough the Yugoslavia Tribunal has tried…other indicted war
criminals, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević is clearly the trial for which
the Ad Hoc Court was created. [Its results] may dictate the ultimate
success or failure of the Tribunal itself as a mechanism for restoring peace
in the Balkans.117
Unfortunately, Milošević died of poor health on 11 March 2006, before he could be
charged.118
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Indictments for Ratko Mladić, the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, and
Radovan Karadžić, the president of Republika Srpska and head of the Serbian
Democratic Party, were issued on 25 July 1995. Both men were instrumental in carrying
out the campaign of ethnic cleansing. The crimes for which they were indicted are
similar in nature to those of Milošević. Radovan Karadžić was apprehended 21 July 2008
and is now facing trial in The Hague.119 Mladić is still at large. If Karadžić is found
guilty it is likely that he will face over 30 years imprisonment. Karadžić’s arrest boosted
hopes that the full scope of crimes committed in Bosnia would be publicly revealed and
acknowledged. His trial would also help to establish the link between a high-level
official and the mass violations of human rights that occurred.120
The use of sexual violence and rape as a tool of warfare is an additional aspect of
the conflict that deserves mention. Much is written about this subject and it is not within
the scope of this paper to address it in detail. However, the ICTY’s June 2004 indictment
of eight Bosnian Serb officers for rape and enslavement of Bosnian Muslim women was
an important development in International Humanitarian Law. These indictments marked
the first time that rape and sexual assault were included as distinct forms of war
crimes.121
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The proceedings of the ICTY are ongoing, but after over 15 years in operation the
effectiveness of the Tribunal must be analyzed. The next section examines how the
ongoing conflict influenced the Tribunal’s success in achieving its four objectives.
Analysis
The accomplishments of the ICTY are outnumbered by its failures. Overall, the
ICTY was much more successful as a symbol of justice than it was as an effective
judicial organ. Many factors impeded the ability of the ICTY to achieve success. Its ad
hoc structure necessarily meant an extended process of planning and implementation.
The search for a Chief Prosecutor, the need to draft a Statute, and collection of funds
contributed to the delayed start to investigations and trials. However, the ICTY’s
implementation conflict proved to have the most significant impact on its effectiveness.
The following section analyzes the influence that the ongoing conflict had on the ICTY’s
ability to fulfill its goals of individual criminal accountability, rule of law, creation and
dissemination of an accurate historical record, and deterrence of future atrocities. Due to
the ongoing conflict it was decided that the ICTY would be based out of The Hague, the
Netherlands. The impact of this decision will be discussed in the assessment of the
ICTY’s ability to achieve its four objectives. Although I argue that the timing greatly
influenced the ICTY’s effectiveness, I acknowledge that not all of the failures of the
Yugoslav Tribunal can be attributed to the ongoing conflict. When appropriate I also
discuss how the ad hoc structure of the Tribunal contributed to its accomplishments and
failures. I suggest that the influence of structure is most evident in the pre-trial stages of
the ICTY. However, because structure is not the focus of my study, I do not seek to
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provide a full analysis of its impact. Ultimately, I conclude that the ongoing conflict in
the region negatively influenced the ICTY’s ability to achieve its four objectives.
Individual Accountability
The ICTY seeks to prosecute those most responsible for the mass violations of
human rights committed in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. The timing of the
ICTY presented three major hurdles to achieving this goal. First, the active conflict
immensely complicated the processes that precede legal prosecution. Gathering witness
testimony, collecting evidence, and apprehending suspects became a chaotic and hugely
complex job. Second, and in direct relation to the aforementioned challenges, the ICTY
spent its early years prosecuting low-level soldiers rather than the leaders who
masterminded the campaign of ethnic cleansing. Thirdly, the ICTY faced accusations of
bias due, in large part, to the violent tensions between ethnic groups—tensions that were
stoked daily by murders, rapes, and other atrocities. Serbs in particular feel
disproportionately targeted for arrest and prosecution.
The complexity of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the large number of crimes to
be investigated added a heavy burden to the newly created tribunal. Due to the ongoing
violence in the region, the Tribunal staff was hindered in its most important task—the
steps involved in preparing for legal prosecution. In order to build a case against
indictees, the Tribunal needed sufficient and accurate evidence. The on-the-ground
situation in the region made this evidence difficult to obtain. The ongoing violence
meant that important documents were nonexistent, destroyed, or withheld by hostile
governments122. Additionally, the conflict in the region and the political tensions inherent
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to such a conflict complicated the relationships between the Tribunal and neighboring
states. Because the ICTY has no enforcement powers of its own, and because evidence
could potentially implicate heads of state in the campaign of ethnic cleansing, the
Tribunal frequently faced direct opposition from certain states when it tried to obtain
documents. Jacob Cogan addresses this issue. He states,
[t]he difficulty of obtaining evidence…is nowhere more complicated than
in the former Yugoslavia, where the alleged crimes were often conducted
by (or under instructions from) state actors and where the evidence of
these crimes remains within the jurisdiction of interested parties.123
Lack of enforcement powers also had a negative influence on the Tribunal’s ability to
gather witness testimony. Witnesses were not easily accessible due to the conflict, and
the security of witnesses and those gathering and translating their testimonials was
difficult to ensure. Apprehending indictees was also hindered by the active conflict.
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslava were highly reluctant (to the point of
hostility) to cooperate with the ICTY by handing over suspects for prosecution in The
Hague.124 The challenges the ICTY faced in its early years were clearly affected by the
circumstances created by the ongoing conflict. The ICTY’s initial struggle in
establishing the grounds upon which successful trials could be built, and especially the
unwillingness of states to arrest and transfer indictees to The Hague, was evidenced by
the low-level perpetrators that were tried in the Tribunal’s first years.
Even before the ICTY was created, UN member states knew who the ‘big fish’
were in the conflict raging in the former Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milošević, Ratko Mladić,
and Radovan Karadžić were recognized as the masterminds and instigators of the
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atrocities. There was however, a significant delay between the establishment of the
Tribunal and the announcement of the indictments issued for Milošević, Karadžić and
Mladić. Mladić and Karadžić were not indicted until the end of 1995, when the Tribunal
had been in operation for nearly two years.125
It is generally agreed upon within the literature that the ICTY has successfully
indicted and charged a majority of those most responsible for the planning and
implementation of the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia. Importantly, only two
indictees remain at large. Despite these successes, due to the chaotic circumstances in
which the ICTY collected evidence, these three men and other high-level perpetrators
were difficult to locate and apprehend. The ICTY’s first Chief Prosecutor, Richard
Goldstone, did not hesitate in voicing his intention to target high-level indictees.
However, prosecution of senior commanders requires sufficient evidence to prove
command responsibility. Gary J. Bass comments that gathering this evidence “was no
small task. Because the Serbs were utterly uncooperative…[m]any of the early
indictments aimed low, at figures too uninvolved in the chain of command to incriminate
the major leaders.”126 Additionally, in the early years of the Tribunal, low-level
perpetrators were much more likely to be apprehended and extradited to The Hague. It
was only later that commanders began to be prosecuted. The indictment and arrest of
Milošević was a major accomplishment for the ICTY. The fact that Milošević stood trial
was significant for a number of reasons. He was the first head of state to be indicted and
tried at an international criminal court.127 In addition, the crimes in which Milošević
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participated were widespread and brutal: ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, deportation,
murder, ethnic cleansing, torture, destruction and appropriation of property, plunder,
forcible transfer, unlawful confinement, and more. Given the nature and extent of his
crimes it is certainly noteworthy that the process of bringing him to justice was initiated,
although due to his death, not completed.
The third obstacle, perhaps the most important to the preservation of lasting
peace, is the widespread belief that the ICTY is a politically motivated institution that
targets Serbs and Croats disproportionately.128 This belief is immensely complicated and
warrants detailed analysis that cannot be provided here. Nevertheless, the perception of
bias obstructs the ICTY’s ability to carry out prosecutions that are accepted as fair and
legitimate by the affected population—victims and perpetrators alike. It is true that ethnic
Serbs compose the majority of the indictments issued by the Tribunal. However,
Akhavan points out that while there is a danger in over-prosecuting individuals belonging
to only one group in a conflict, there is a parallel danger of misrepresenting who
committed crimes.129
Unfortunately, the view that the ICTY is a political tool used by the victors and
the West to punish Serbia remains strong. Another criticism of the ICTY, unrelated to
Serb nationalism, emphasizes the Tribunal’s refusal to investigate alleged war crimes
committed by NATO, namely the indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations. This
refusal led to protestations that the ICTY favors the Western nations that played the main
role in its creating and the funding of its operations. Perceived lack of legitimacy has
been the most persistent barrier to a favorable view of the ICTY. Perceptions of bias must
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continue to be monitored to ensure that all people view the Tribunal’s decisions as
legitimate. Serbian dissatisfaction with the Tribunal however, cannot be countered unless
the rule of law is re-established in the region. Most importantly, institutions responsible
for supporting the military and spreading propaganda must be shut down. This is at the
heart of the Tribunal’s third objective.
Rule of Law
To determine the success of the Tribunal in restoring rule of law to areas of
conflict, I examine two elements: dismantling responsible institutions and supporting the
national judicial system. The ongoing conflict was significant in that it complicated the
processes necessary to re-establish rule of law. The geographically removed location of
the Tribunal, a direct result of the ongoing conflict, also contributed to the ICTY’s failure
to fully achieve this objective.
Propaganda was used extensively during the conflict in the former Yugoslav
territories. Milošević and Serb nationalists relied heavily upon media outlets that fueled
the fires of Serb nationalism. In 2004, The International Center for Transitional Justice
reported, “widespread distrust of the Tribunal…is…fueled by state propaganda [which
depicts the court] as anti-Serb.”130 The message of ethnic hatred that was encouraged by
Milošević was part and parcel to many Yugoslav institutions, specifically the military.
Law enforcement and the judicial system helped support Milošević’ campaign as well.
Dan Saxon notes,
The Milosevic era was…marked by the presence of criminal structures
that permeated the police and other security institutions…in spite of the
fact that Milosevic and many of his clique have been removed from formal
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positions of power, these criminal structures reportedly still exist in Serbia
today.131
These institutions must be disabled before the positive impacts of the ICTY can be
measured in the region. Lustration policies are one of the most important steps in
disabling structures that incite hatred. These policies are most frequently carried out by
national governments and involve removing state officials and military leaders who were
involved in perpetuating the campaign of ethnic cleansing. The ICTY cannot be, nor
should it be, the primary tool for carrying out lustration policies. However, by indicting
culpable individuals in state institutions, the Tribunal could help disrupt the cycle of
violence and hatred that fueled the conflict. As discussed in the analysis of individual
criminal responsibility, the ICTY did succeed in arresting and prosecuting a few of the
key leaders of the mass violence in the former Yugoslavia. Yet, in 2000 the International
Crisis Group (ICG) reported that over 75 people directly connected to the perpetration of
mass human rights violations, remained in positions of power in the Republika Srpska.
This statistic is yet more evidence that the ongoing conflict negatively influenced the
ICTY’s ability to locate and purge personnel who supported the violence.
The decision to locate the ICTY in The Hague, the Netherlands, was practical
considering the active conflict and decimated judicial system in the territories of the
former Yugoslavia. It is important to note that the location of the Tribunal was a direct
result of the timing of the ICTY. Had the Tribunal been established in the aftermath of
conflict, chances increase that it be located closer to the ‘scene of the crimes’. Neil Kritz
states, “[i]t is axiomatic that the weaker the connection between the international
operation and the local population, the easier it will be for its work to be ignored or
131

Dan Saxon, “Exporting Justice: Perceptions of the ICTY Among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim
Communities in the Former Yugoslavia,” Journal of Human Rights 4 (October-December, 2005): 567.

61

dismissed as an alien effort irrelevant to the concerns of the country.”132 Proximity to the
affected population is essential for a number of reasons, one of which is the hope that an
international tribunal will contribute to the rebuilding of the national judicial system.133
Many proponents of international criminal tribunals posit that tribunals play an important
role in internalizing a respect for human rights in the judicial system of a state or region
where mass human rights violations have occurred.134 In the case of the former
Yugoslavia, members of the domestic judiciary were marginally involved in the justice
process. The geographic distance of the Tribunal created a situation where the pursuit of
justice was largely removed from the populations most affected by the violence. The task
of re-establishing the rule of law in the context of mass human rights violations is a
monumental task, which must involve international and domestic efforts originating from
many different sources. The ICTY was crippled by the ongoing conflict and the many
predicaments it presented. How do you re-establish law in a region that is in the midst of
atrocities and armed violence? The ICTY’s failure to fully dismantle responsible
institutions and impart norms of human rights to the national judiciary was directly
related to the circumstances in which it was forced to operate.
Creation and distribution of historical record
The creation and dissemination of an accurate historical record is the third
objective sought by the ICTY. As a judicial organ, the ICTY contributes to building an
historical record in a number of ways. There are varying opinions about the ability of any
132
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sort of legal institution to truly capture the horror of atrocities such as genocide.135 This
argument has merit, but I believe that judicial organs do produce records that can
contribute to acknowledging specific events that occur during mass violence. Legal
prosecutions and the focus on personal criminal responsibility transfers guilt that may be
placed on an entire group, to individuals. A successful trial depends on evidence and
witness testimonies. The documents created by trials help to establish the overall context
in which mass violence took place. Legal records also reveal truth about victims’ and
perpetrators’ personal experiences during the violence. In the case of the former
Yugoslavia, the creation and distribution of such a record is of the utmost importance.
The Tribunal must be viewed as legitimate, if properly distributed an accurate account of
events reinforces the validity of the ICTY in the eyes of affected populations. Similar to
the difficulties encountered in the ICTY’s attempt to re-establish rule of law, the ongoing
conflict and the resultant location of the Tribunal negatively impacted its ability to
achieve this third objective. To the extent that legal prosecutions help create an historical
record, the ICTY achieved its goal. Unfortunately, the ICTY has not been able to
effectively distribute this record to those to whom it is most important—namely, the
people residing in the region of the former Yugoslavia.
It is difficult to empirically measure the extent to which information on legal
prosecutions in The Hague, have reached people in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
etc. Ideally, outreach by an international court would utilize a number of different tools
including television, radio, newspaper publications, and live broadcasts of trials. Each of
these helps to establish a connection between a distant tribunal and the people who
135
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suffered, witnesses, or participated in the violence. There is sufficient evidence to
suggest that the ICTY has not done an adequate job of disseminating information that
could offset perceptions of bias. Akhavan states,
[t]o the extent that peoples in the former Yugoslavia are denied access to
proceedings of the ICTY, the truth exposed through the judicial process
may have no appreciable impact on interethnic reconciliation...[a]s a
result, the forces that fomented ethnic violence in the first place remain
free to influence the way in which the work of the Tribunal is perceived.136
It is generally agreed upon that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was not one based
solely on long-standing ethnic hatred. Rather, Milošević and other leaders used the
language of ethnic hatred to consolidate power in the hands of Serbian nationalists. The
ICTY’s mandate includes the restoration and maintenance of peace. It is essential that
the ethnic hatred that was so vigorously encouraged during the conflict be deconstructed.
Trials, and the information they expose, can help counter those that deny the occurrence
of events or their responsibility in perpetrating the crimes.137 In May 2002, the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs “found that eighty per cent of 1,300 Serbs
believed the Tribunal prosecutes Serbs more vigorously than it does non-Serbs, while
fifty-seven percent said they were convinced the trial was unjust.”138 These statistics,
gathered almost a decade after the creation of the Tribunal, reveal that ICTY outreach
attempts have not reached the necessary populations. Studies conducted in 2004 and
2005, by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing found that
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approximately 72% of Serbs did not understand what the ICTY does.139 Part of this
failure is due to the language barrier between the Tribunal proceedings (official
languages are English and French) and the people in the region where the crimes were
committed. In 1998-1999 the ICTY Outreach Program was created to address issues of
accessibility. Currently, the official website provides videos for viewing trial
proceedings.140 The Program also translates court documents into the region’s native
languages. This is a major step toward alleviating the accusations of bias that continue to
haunt the Tribunal. However, trials are hardly accessible to the average viewer—they are
long, opaque, and conducted in legal jargon that few people outside of the legal
profession are familiar with.141
The timing of the ICTY negatively influenced its ability to create and disseminate
an historical record. The ongoing conflict made it necessary for the ICTY to be located
outside of the region in which the atrocities took place. The Tribunal thus suffered lack of
access to evidence and testimony. Ultimately, the physical distance between the trial
proceedings and the target population resulted in perceptions of bias that threatens the
legitimacy of the Tribunal’s pursuit of justice. Studies conducted in 2006, indicate that
the Serb opinions of the Tribunal are beginning to improve.142 It remains to be seen
whether the ICTY will be considered a legitimate instrument of justice in the years to
come.
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Deterrence
The ICTY’s ability to achieve deterrence—general and specific—was
handicapped from the beginning. The decision to implement the ICTY during conflict
resulted in the extended mandate of the Tribunal. As mentioned previously, the ICTY
was charged with the restoration and maintenance of peace, as well as the pursuit of
criminal justice.143 For a judicial organ with no real enforcement capabilities, operating
in the midst of continued violence, this is a tall order. Ultimately, the ICTY did little to
stop the continuation of atrocities. Lilian Barria and Steven Roper write, “The existence
of the Tribunal and the possibility of being indicted did not seem to encourage an ending
of hostilities and the examination of peaceful methods to solve the differences between
the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims.”144 The ICTY was implemented approximately
a year after the conflict in the former Yugoslavia began and thousands of people had
already been killed. The July 1995 attack on Srebrenica is the most startling indication
that the ICTY had no deterrent effect. This attack, led by Mladić’s forces, resulted in the
massacre of approximately 8,000 Muslim civilians. The ICTY was established two years
prior to the Srebrenica murders. It is evident that the threat of criminal prosecution did
little to dissuade Serb forces from carrying out the massacre. The ICTY’s failure to
achieve its fourth objective is due, in large part, to its lack of enforcement capabilities.
Kenneth Rodman suggests that any potential deterrent effect was significantly reduced
since large-scale atrocities had already been committed. He states, “by the time an
international criminal tribunal asserts jurisdiction in an ongoing conflict, large-scale
atrocities have already occurred and responsibility almost certainly resides in the top
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leadership of the governments and rebel groups”.145 By the time the Yugoslav Tribunal
was fully operational there was little motivation for people such as General Ratko Mladić
to stop committing atrocities.
It is important to note that the ICTY’s failure to achieve its final goal of
deterrence is due, in large part, to its absolute lack of enforcement powers. There is no
ICTY ‘police force’ to ensure that the threat of prosecution is carried out. Rodman posits,
“The ICTY’s contribution to stigmatizing extremists, and deterring ethnic violence, in
post-Dayton Bosnia only became possible because of the NATO air campaign”.146 As
will be seen in the remaining case studies the ICTY was not alone in its lack of
enforcement powers or in its failure to achieve a deterrent effect.
Conclusion
The ongoing conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia made it more
difficult for the ICTY to achieve its four objectives. As the first ad hoc international
criminal tribunal established by the UNSC, the ICTY confronted the multiple challenges
of being the first of its kind. Yet, the challenges facing the ICTY were made more acute
due to its implementation during ongoing conflict and continued atrocities. The case of
the ICTY leads me to conclude that ongoing conflict negatively impacted the ability of
the ICTY to achieve its four objectives. The timing of the Tribunal was significant
because it complicated the ability for the ICTY to do the following: ensure the security of
staff, personnel, and witnesses; collect evidence; gather witness testimony; apprehend
suspects; and access the most affected population. The ongoing conflict in the former
Yugoslavia made the activities necessary for an effective tribunal, difficult to complete.
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Even before the ICTY was formally established, the conflict dictated the terms of the
Tribunal. Due to the violence that continued unabated in the former Yugoslavia, the
ICTY was forced to operate from The Hague. The distant location in turn, made it much
more difficult for the ICTY to create and distribute an accurate historical record to the
people who could benefit the most from the proceedings—the population who were
witnessing, suffering, and participating in the atrocities. The case of the ICTY
demonstrates just how important timing can be in influencing the conditions in which a
tribunal operates. The failures of the ICTY cannot all be attributed to its having been
implemented during conflict. The next case study examines the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, a tribunal that was established in the aftermath of conflict. The
case study of the ICTY demonstrates that ongoing conflict makes the challenges of
pursuing justice more acute. However, the case of the ICTR shows that even in the
absence of conflict, problems remain.
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Chapter III: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Pursuing Justice in the Absence of Conflict:
The Influence of Delayed Implementation
Introduction
On 6 April 1994 Hutu extremists in Rwanda began a violent campaign to
exterminate all Tutsis and their supporters. For three months the massacre continued and
resulted in more than 800,000 deaths—over ten percent of Rwanda’s total population.
After a period of horror that defies description, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Army147
(RPA) gained control of Kigali, Rwanda, on 17 July 1994. The genocide left Rwanda
devastated. In September 1994, the Rwandese government requested that the UN create
an ad-hoc international criminal tribunal to try those responsible for the genocide in
Rwanda. At the time of the government’s request, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia was operational. The ICTY served as a useful precedent; the
United Nations Security Council heeded the Rwandese request and passed Resolution
955, thereby creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
ICTR, located in Arusha, Tanzania, is currently in progress and is expected to complete
all trials by the end of 2009.148
The establishment of the ICTR occurred in much different circumstances than that
of its sister tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. In the former Yugoslavia, a tribunal was
implemented in the midst of conflict and continued atrocities. In the case of Rwanda, it
was only after the killings had ended that a tribunal was conceived of and implemented.
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Serious consideration of creating a tribunal for Rwanda was only voiced in the wake of
the massacres, by which time the RPF government was installed and in control of a
relatively stable government in Rwanda. This difference in timing means that the Rwanda
Tribunal provides an alternative lens through which to assess the effectiveness of
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. This chapter will focus on how implementation
in the aftermath of conflict influences the ICTR’s ability to achieve the four objectives of
accountability mechanisms.149
The delayed timing of the ICTR’s implementation was significant in that the
absence of conflict allowed for certain conditions to arise that proved favorable to the
ICTR’s operations. The absence of conflict allowed for the following: the installation of
a new and stable government, a cessation of hostilities resulting in increased security for
tribunal staff and personnel, and better access to evidence and witnesses. Due to the
delayed timing, the RPF government was able to gain effective control of the political
and military affairs of the nation. The infrastructure of Rwanda was destroyed after three
months of killing, yet the Rwanda Tribunal (unlike its predecessor in the former
Yugoslavia) was not faced with some of the obstacles presented by pursing justice in
ongoing conflict. The circumstances in which the ICTR was implemented clearly
improved its chances of success. The ICTR’s implementation in the absence of conflict
helped alleviate some of the problems that plagued the Yugoslav Tribunal’s operations.150
However, establishing the Rwanda Tribunal in the aftermath of mass violence did not
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resolve all the challenges confronted by the ICTY. To this day, the ICTR must contend
with certain difficulties caused by the existence of the RPF government. The ICTR’s
main challenge in this regard stems from Hutus who believe the RPF government wants
to use the Rwanda Tribunal to seek revenge for Hutu crimes during the genocide. This
perception of ‘victor’s justice’ arises from the fact that the RPF government took power
by disposing the previous regime. The Rwandan Patriotic Army, a rebel army composed
mainly of Tutsis, successfully overthrew the extremist Hutu regime that had presided
over the genocide. Two main components contribute to the threat that the ICTR will
carry out a limited victor’s justice. First, after the RPF’s defeat of the extremist Hutu
government, the RPF government’s subsequent request for the establishment of a tribunal
proves to some (Hutu extremists) that the ICTR will be a cover for Tutsi-led vengeance.
Its identity as a Tutsi-dominated party has major implications for the perceived fairness
of the ICTR. Secondly, although the vast majority of genocide victims were Tutsi,
targeted killing by the RPA is also well documented. In Alison Des Forge’s
groundbreaking account of the Rwandan genocide, she reports that approximately 30,000
Hutu were murdered during the RPF’s struggle to regain control of Rwanda.151 The
failure of the ICTR to investigate crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army
continues to be a point of contention and concerns have been raised that the Tribunal is
helping to carry out victor’s justice.
Despite the fact that the United Nations and the ICTR had no part in this victory,
there is a danger that the justice rendered by the Tribunal will be negatively affected by
this perceived bias. If Hutus believe the Tribunal is merely a tool for vengeance, it is
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unlikely that the divisions between Tutsi and Hutu will be healed. As Mark Drumbl
notes, the perceived legitimacy of the ICTR “is a key factor in determining whether the
society remains postgenocidal or intergenocidal…societies are always over shadowed by
the possibility that genocide may reoccur.”152 The ICTR case demonstrates that certain
weaknesses of tribunals remain regardless of timing.
The absence of conflict facilitated the ICTR’s ability to achieve the objectives of
individual criminal accountability and the re-establishment of rule of law. Article 1 of the
Statute indicates that individual accountability is achieved by prosecuting most
responsible for the crimes committed. Responsibility extends to those who planned and
instigated the violence as well as those who carried it out.153 The main boon to the
Tribunal was the existence of the RPF government. Individual accountability was easier
to attain because many of those who helped plan and carry out the genocide were
captured when the RPF entered Kigali in mid-July. Security of witnesses, prosecutors and
judges was better ensured. To evaluate the ability of the ICTR to establish rule of law, I
examine two factors: 1) the Tribunal’s ability to dismantle institutions that contributed to
perpetuating the genocide, and 2) the extent to which the Tribunal succeeded in
supporting and augmenting the national judicial system by providing an alternative
means of prosecutorial justice. The RPF victory also ensured that institutions guilty of
inciting hatred (such as various radio stations) were shut down. The national judiciary
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benefited from the RPF’s willingness to work alongside the ICTR in holding individuals
accountable.
The last two objectives of the tribunal: the creation and dissemination of an
accurate historical record and the deterrence of future atrocities did not fare as well. To
assess the ICTR’s success in the creation and distribution of a historical record, I analyze
two factors: 1) the extent to which the ICTR was able to create a full and unbiased
account of the genocide and, 2) its success in disseminating this record to the population
most affected—in this case, Rwandan citizens. I conclude that the creation of an
historical record was hindered due to the perceived bias of the RPF government that had
requested the establishment of the ICTR. Additionally, the Tribunal was ineffective in
disseminating information on the trials and activities of the Court. Two levels of
deterrence are evaluated—specific and general. In the context of Rwanda, specific
deterrence refers to the prevention of future atrocities committed in Rwanda by those
affected by the violence. This violence could be in the form of retaliation and revenge, or
further anti-Tutsi murders. General deterrence suggests the prevention of all future
atrocities. The ICTR definitively failed in its attempt to deter future crimes, both general
and specific. This failure demonstrates that problems continue to haunt international
tribunals even without the complications presented by ongoing conflict.
Although my findings focus on how absence of conflict influenced the ICTR’s
effectiveness, I would be remiss in not considering another influential factor: structure.
that influenced the ICTR. I identify two additional factors that must be considered for a
complete analysis of the ICTR’s effectiveness: the structure of the mechanism (ie: ad hoc
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international tribunal) and the location of the mechanism154. The influence of structure on
the effectiveness of ad hoc international criminal tribunals warrants further in-depth
research. This project does not spend considerable time analyzing its impact.
Nevertheless, a brief overview will raise questions that should be considered and
expanded upon in further research of international justice mechanisms.
Genocide in Rwanda: Context and Events
On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and
President Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down.155 Both men died and over the next
three months an estimated 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda.156 The killings in
Rwanda were brutal and torture and rape were rampant during the three months in which
the violence took place. The genocide was planned, instigated and carried out by Hutu
extremists against Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and a staggering number of ‘ordinary’
Hutu citizens also participated in the mass killings. The atrocities ended when the
Rwandan Patriotic Army, composed primarily of Tutsis operating out of Uganda, invaded
Rwanda and took control of the government in mid July 1994.157 I provide a summary of
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the relevant history of Rwanda158 and the important events of the genocide. I briefly
examine the reaction of the United Nations before, during, and after the violence.
Like the majority of other countries in Africa, Rwanda was under colonial rule
until independence in 1962. Prior to World War I, present-day Rwanda was under
German control. In 1923, Rwanda was placed under Belgian rule as part of the League of
Nations mandate system. During its time as a Belgian-controlled colony, the social
classes were highly stratified along ethnic lines. The familiar refrain of long-standing
ethnic hatred between the Tutsis and Hutus was, according to the majority of
contemporary scholars, one based on ethnic identities that were solidified and
manipulated during colonial rule. On this subject, scholar Filip Reyntjens states “[a]
number of interventions by the Belgian administration streamlined, reinforced and
exacerbated ethnic belonging, and eventually turned the ‘ethnic groups’ into politically
relevant categories.”159 European notions of racial superiority, which deemed the Tutsi to
be of European ancestry, granted the Tutsi population privilege in positions in the
education, military and governmental spheres.160 As far back as the 17th century, the
minority Tutsi was estimated as 10% of the population, the Hutus comprised the majority
of the remaining 80%161. Tensions between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority
continued to mount and in February 1957, Hutu elites issued the ‘Bahutu Manifesto’.
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This document “expressed the Hutu elite’s desire to end Tutsi dominance once and for
all.”162
The proliferation of political parties prior to the Revolution was evidence of the
massive strain between the Hutu and Tutsi populations.163 In 1959 a breaking point was
reached. The Revolution of 1959 was initiated by the Hutus with the support of the
Belgians, who in the late 1950s had ended its political alliance with the Tutsis.164 In 1962
Rwanda gained its independence but the Hutu-led Revolution claimed approximately
10,000 Tutsi lives.165 The violent Revolution caused a large number of Tutsis to flee
Rwanda and seek refuge in neighboring countries. Some of those who fled Rwanda after
the 1959 Revolution amassed in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania
and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). These refugees formed a number
of armed groups, which then launched attacks on the Hutu-led government of Rwanda.166
In 1973, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power of the government in
a coup. Habyarimana, a Hutu, formed the National Revolutionary Movement for
Development (MRND), which operated as the sole political party in Rwanda. The
policies adopted by the MRND and promoted by President Habyarimana sought to
consolidate power in the hands of the Hutu.167 The Hutu elites also continued the
Belgian-established practice of including ethnic origin on identity cards.168 Violence
against the Tutsi minority was common during this period. Jose Alvarez notes, “[i]n 1990
162
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to 1991, amid continuing massacres of Tutsis, the Rwandan army began to train and arm
civilian militias known as the interahamwe”.169 The interahamwe, translated as “those
who stand together” became a major player in the mass violence that enveloped Rwanda
in the early 1990s.
On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front based out of northern Uganda,
invaded Northern Rwanda. The RPF was composed largely of Rwandan Tutsis who had
fled the country in the wake of the Revolution in 1959.170 The invasion started a conflict
between the RPF and the Hutu-led Rwandan government that did not quiet until 1992, at
which time negotiation processes began. The negotiations resulted in the short-lived
Arusha Peace Agreements, signed in August 1993.171 The Agreements were lauded as
the paradigm of conflict resolution, and contained provisions that required President
Habyarimana to cooperate with demands for a multi-party system in Rwanda. The
Accords also included provisions for integration of Tutsis into the Hutu-dominated
national armed forces, and addressed the issue of repatriation and resettlement of the
peoples (mostly Tutsi) that had been displaced during and after the 1959 Revolution.172
Unfortunately, the implementation of the Arusha Accords was entirely
unsuccessful. The protocols set out by the Accords were immensely unpopular with the
majority of the Hutu elites in Rwanda. There was deep suspicion that the RPF would not
169
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uphold the cease-fire. One of the most contentious issues of the Accords was the
provision regarding the integration of the armed forces. Joel Stettenheim notes that
President Habyarimana’s government was prepared to offer a 20 percent quota to the
RPF, but the RPF demanded a fifty-fifty split.173 Stettenheim cites political infighting, an
ineffective security force and extremists’ plans for violence as important factors in the
collapse of the Arusha Accords. He particularly emphasizes that the “extremists’ plans
was the development of a rural militia and the manipulation of ethnicity to create a
climate of fear.”174 By the time President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6 April
1994, a climate of fear was in place. Mass violence erupted the next day.
Militias such as the interahamwe, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) of the
Presidential Guard, local ‘defense’ groups and individual citizens participated. Hundred
of thousands of civilians who had never killed before, freely murdered their neighbors. In
much of the literature, academic and personal accounts, the particularly personal nature
of the genocide is noted. Alain Destexhe explains, “pupils were killed by their teachers,
shop owners by their customers, neighbour killed neighbour and husbands killed
wives”.175 The brutality of the genocide in Rwanda is well documented. In Mahmood
Mamdani’s seminal work When Victims Become Killers he explains, “it required not one
but many hacks of a machete to kill even one person. With a machete, killing was hard
work, that is why there were often several killers for every single person”.176 Systematic
planning was evident and the spread of anti-Tutsi propaganda helped spur the killing
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on.177 The genocide continued until 19 July 1994, when the RPF successfully installed a
new government in the capital of Kigali. The RPF government gained control of a
country whose infrastructure was entirely destroyed by the killing. The Rwandan judicial
system was in ruins and it is estimated that only sixteen lawyers were alive at the end of
the killing.178 High-level leaders of the genocide who had not been killed during the RPF
capture of Kigali were removed from government posts. Those who were not arrested or
killed fled the country. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide a large number of
internally displaced peoples, refugees, and Hutus who feared retaliatory killings by the
new government flooded into neighboring countries.
In the extant literature, the genocide in Rwanda is recognized as a result of one of
three factors: ethnic hatred (either created or inherent), a Hutu-led struggle for
consolidation of political power, and a series of failed economic policies. It is unlikely
that any one factor can be identified as the catalyst for genocide, and an answer to this
query is not of vital importance to this thesis. A combination of one or more of the above
factors seems the most likely explanation for an event whose horror resists human
logic.179
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As the genocide in Rwanda was perpetrated, the world looked on and the primary
bodies of global governance, namely the United Nations, did nothing. Some scholars and
human rights advocates blame the colossal death toll in Rwanda on the inaction of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). For the purposes of examining the ICTR,
pointing fingers is not a productive exercise. In the next section I will examine the role
of the international community during the time period before, during, and after the
genocide in Rwanda. I probe this matter not in an effort to place blame, but rather
because the international community and specifically the UNSC is inextricably linked to
the creation and operation of the ICTR.
Security Resolution 872 established the United Nations Assistance Mission For
Rwanda (UNAMIR) in October 1993. Its primary responsibility was to oversee the
implementation of the Arusha Accords.180 UNAMIR, initially composed of
approximately 2,500 military personnel, was also responsible for monitoring the security
during the time period in which the Accords would be carried out.181 UNAMIR was on
the ground when the genocide began, and the United Nations’ decision to diminish its
numbers in the midst of mass violence against Tutsis and Hutu moderates earned it much
criticism. Central to this decision was a debate on the efficacy of an enlarged UNAMIR
force. Would a larger force be able to halt current violence and prevent further death?
Or, were the peacekeepers essentially impotent in their ability to stem the killing? The
death of ten Belgian peacekeepers just one day into the violence, and Belgium’s
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subsequent withdrawal of all their forces involved in UNAMIR, seemed to convince
other nations that there was too much danger in sending reinforcements. After
deliberation by the UN Security Council, the decision was made to diminish UNAMIR’s
presence to a mere 270 military personnel.182 Michael Barnett explains that by
significantly reducing UNAMIR the remaining “UN troops were instantly confronted by
two increasingly untenable tasks: protecting the lives of civilians and defending
themselves.”183 It is widely acknowledged that the UNAMIR commander, General
Roméo Dallaire, made a valiant effort to achieve both tasks. Ultimately, Dallaire and the
rest of the UNAMIR personnel were thwarted by the mass violence overtaking the
country and their skeleton crew of UN soldiers.
Throughout the UNSC deliberations, the word ‘genocide’ was notably absent.
According to numerous scholars there was an extreme hesitancy to use genocide as a
description of the atrocities being carried out in Rwanda.184 Barnett states, “the Security
Council was reluctant to utter the word genocide. Its very mention had the raw, discursive
capacity to demand action…there appeared to be a tacit understanding to avoid such
inflammatory language.”185 Other scholars are more pointed in their observations on this
topic. Hintjens suggests that the avoidance was far from tacit. She states, “US
government employees were reportedly ordered to refrain from using the term ‘genocide’
in any official pronouncements on Rwanda.”186 Even human rights organizations did not
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describe the events in Rwanda as genocide until well into the second week of mass
killings.187 By the time of this public recognition approximately 100,000 people had
already been killed in Rwanda with many more to follow.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The Rwandan government’s request for the creation of a tribunal resulted in five
months of investigation into the atrocities committed during the Rwandan genocide. At
the conclusion of the investigation, a commission of experts (established by the UNSC)
recommended the immediate creation of a tribunal to try those responsible for the crimes.
The report provided by the commission references the existence of “overwhelming
evidence to prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi group…constitute genocide.”188
On 8 November 1994 the UNSC adopted Resolution 955, thereby establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.189 The decision was made to base the
Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. This choice was dictated by the condition of Rwanda after
months of mass violence. The Rwandan justice system was decimated and the
infrastructure of the country was in disarray. Most of the citizens who had judicial or
legal experience were either dead or had already left the country. In this section I
introduce basic information on the Rwandan Tribunal. I conclude by presenting the goals
of the Rwandan Tribunal.
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The founding of the Rwandan Tribunal was influenced by the Yugoslav Tribunal,
which was operating out of The Hague, The Netherlands. Like the ICTY, the ICTR was
established under the auspices of Chapter VII powers. The Security Council deemed the
situation in Rwanda to “constitute a threat to international peace and security”.190 Early in
the process of creating the Rwandan Tribunal, it was decided that it would be closely
linked to the ICTY. Although the two tribunals would be separate, the Security Council
determined that in order to preserve “a unity of legal approach, as well as economy and
efficiency of resources” certain aspects of the tribunals, including the Appeals Chamber,
would be shared between the two.191 Article 15(3) of the ICTR Statute asserts that the
prosecutor of the ICTY will also serve as chief prosecutor for the Rwandan Tribunal, but
may “have additional staff, including an additional Deputy Prosecutor to assist with
prosecutions before the International Tribunal for Rwanda.” Proponents of this
connection between the tribunals argued it would protect the continuity of international
law and consistency of prosecution. This approach also sidestepped the protracted
selection process involved with choosing a lead prosecutor and necessary judges. Critics
contended that it handicapped the ability of the ICTR to fulfill its obligations. Madeline
Morris points out that with such a gargantuan task facing the Rwandan Tribunal, it
seemed ill-advised to provide the ICTR with a relatively small staff that is divided
between two vitally important judicial organs.192 There were also concerns that a shared
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Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber would hinder the ability of the Tribunal to be duly
relevant to the unique situation of Rwanda.193
Although the two tribunals share a Prosecutor and an Appeals Chamber, the
nature of the conflict in Rwanda demanded slightly different definitions of the crimes the
ICTR would prosecute. Instead of defining crimes against humanity as those committed
“in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population”194, the ICTR Statute designates crimes against humanity as those
committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”.195 Prior to the Yugoslav
Tribunal crimes against humanity were mainly recognized as applicable in international
conflicts only. The Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal expanded this customary
interpretation to include those crimes committed in the midst of internal conflicts. The
ICTR Statute follows this precedent. In addition to crimes against humanity, the ICTR’s
subject-matter jurisdiction includes crimes of genocide. Due to the non-international
nature of the conflict, the ICTR also has jurisdiction over violations of Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.196
Article 7 of the ICTR Statute limits its temporal jurisdiction to those crimes
committed in Rwanda from the 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1994. 1 January 1994
was chosen by the Security Council in an attempt to include the planning and
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organizational stages of the genocide. The end date was chosen in an effort to ensure
jurisdiction over crimes committed after the Hutu government was ousted in July 1994.197
Although seemingly specific, these dates are largely arbitrary and indicate compromise
between the Rwandan Government and the Security Council198. The aforementioned
compromise on the dates however, necessitates a brief discussion of the Rwandan
Government’s involvement in the establishment and operation of the Tribunal.
The Rwandan Government, as early as September 1994, requested a tribunal
similar to that created for the former Yugoslavia. In a letter dated 28 September 1994
from the Representative of Rwanda to the President of the Security Council, the Rwandan
government stated four justifications. First, the Rwandan government emphasized, “the
genocide committed in Rwanda is a crime against humankind and should be suppressed
by the international community as a whole.”199 Second, the Rwandan government
desired a tribunal because it wanted to avoid “any suspicion of its wanting to organize
speedy, vengeful justice.”200 Third, the government believed that a culture of impunity
could not be allowed to prevail.201 Finally, the Rwandan Government requested an
international tribunal in the hopes that it would be “easier to get at those criminals who
have found refuge in foreign countries.”202 Payam Akhavan explains that their
enthusiasm for supporting a tribunal “resulted in part from the military defeat of the party
responsible for the genocide, so that the successor government [the Rwandan Patriotic
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Front]…stood to benefit from the punishment and political isolation of its
predecessors.”203
In spite of their initial enthusiasm for a tribunal, the Rwandan Government was
ultimately dissatisfied with certain aspects of the proposed ad-hoc tribunal. The
government disagreed with the limited temporal jurisdiction of the court, believing it
would not adequately cover the pre-planning and planning stages of the genocide. The
Rwandan government hoped for a tribunal that would extend from 1990 through to July
1994.204 There was also a concern that the ICTR would be wholly ineffective if it were
forced to share an Appeals Chamber and Prosecutor with the ICTY.205 The Rwandan
Government voiced opposition to the location of the ICTR. To locate it in Arusha,
Tanzania, was to separate it from the people most affected by the genocide. According to
Ralph Zacklin and Daphna Shraga the Rwandan government’s decision to vote against
the creation of a tribunal was largely due to “the realization that the International
Tribunal…was not responsive to the wishes of the Government, in particular that capital
punishment be imposed on the former leaders and principal planners of the crime of
genocide.”206 The government was wary of the possible disparity between those who
were prosecuted nationally versus those criminals who were tried by the ICTR. In
national courts the death penalty could be imposed on the lesser criminals, yet those
prosecuted by the ICTR, presumably those ‘most responsible’ for the crimes committed,
would never face the death sentence. The Rwandan delegate suggested, “the
establishment of so ineffective an international tribunal would only appease the
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conscience of the international community rather than respond to the expectations of the
Rwandese people and of the victims of genocide in particular.”207 Although Resolution
955 passed without the vote of Rwanda, the Rwandan Government pledged to support the
ICTR in accomplishing its objectives.
The timing of the ICTR meant that the Tribunal had little to do in way of stopping
active violence; after the RPF took power the killing was largely halted. Unlike the
ICTY, the Rwandan Tribunal did not have to contend with an ongoing conflict in which
atrocities were being committed daily. Nevertheless, the ICTR was implemented after a
genocide that was ostensibly based on the extermination of one ethnic group and those
who supported them. It would be false to claim that because the killing had ended, peace
was inevitable. The ICTR’s desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace required it to
seek the solution to such long-term goals as national reconciliation. The ICTR also had
to contend with a country whose infrastructure was completely devastated.
In contrast to the ICTY, no fierce debate on the seeming disconnect between
peace and justice ensued. In Rwanda, the violence was over and so the pursuit of justice
did not provoke as many concerns as it had during the creation of the ICTY. Due to its
timing I argue that the ICTR’s challenges were less complex than those of the ICTY.
From the outset the Rwandan Tribunal did not have to face the difficulties present when
seeking justice during ongoing mass human rights violations. This is not to say that there
were no challenges facing the ICTR. Rather, I believe that the challenges manifested
themselves differently due to the timing of the ICTR. In particular, I conclude that the
delayed timing allowed for the creation of certain conditions conducive to the
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achievement of the first two goals of the tribunal, individual accountability and reestablishment of rule of law. In particular, the timing of the ICTR allowed the RPF
government to gain effective control over the territory, thereby easing some of the
processes necessary to the operation of the ICTR. It is important to note however, that
although timing helped create certain favorable conditions the ICTR’s implementation in
the aftermath of conflict cannot be directly linked to its failures.
Analysis
The ICTR faces four major challenges in rendering justice: the mass participation
in the genocide, the decimation of Rwanda’s infrastructure—specifically the judicial
system, the new government established by the victorious RPF, and the escape of
perpetrators across the border into neighboring countries. These factors cannot be
overlooked in an investigation of the effectiveness of the Tribunal. Akhavan helpfully
summarizes the long list of challenges facing the Tribunal. He cites
the recruitment and placement of qualified international staff on short notice;
making logistical and security arrangements for criminal investigations in an
impoverished country devastated by war…gathering the testimony of witnesses
and victims who are severely traumatized, fearful of reprisals, and often hard to
find among a massive population of displaced persons and refugees.208
It was clear from the outset that it would be impossible for the ICTR to prosecute even a
fraction of those who participated in the massacres in Rwanda. Mahmood Mamdani
explains that the massacres “were carried out by hundred of thousands, perhaps even
more, and witnessed by millions.”209 The reality of the situation meant that the ICTR, an
organ created to pursue justice and end impunity, would be forced to concentrate on
prosecuting those ‘most responsible’, in spite of the fact that this excluded hundreds of
208
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thousands of citizens who participated in the genocide. The second major challenge that
faced the ICTR is directly related to its establishment in the aftermath of mass violence.
All wars cause destruction, but the targeted nature of the killing in Rwanda resulted in
complete devastation of all institutions and infrastructure within the country. The
decision to operate the Tribunal out of Arusha, Tanzania, was a result of this destruction.
In this section I provide analysis of the ICTR’s ability to achieve its four
objectives. Some goals, such as individual accountability and establishment of rule of
law, were more successful than others. The creation of an accurate historical record and
deterrence of future crimes were two goals that proved more elusive. In the case of the
ICTR the successes and failures of these objectives are largely due to the existence of the
RPF government and the corresponding perception of victor’s justice. The ICTR was
implemented after conflict and this timing allowed for the creation and consolidation of
the RPF government. Due to the extent that the political situation in Rwanda impacted
the ICTR, I frame my analysis in terms of the Rwandan government and its influence on
the Tribunal’s effectiveness. I outline both the hurdles and the advantages presented by
the timing of the ICTR. I conclude that the ICTR’s successes are due in large part to the
timing of its implementation. It has been particularly effective in its ability to achieve
individual criminal responsibility.
In the final part of my analysis I consider the impact of other factors that should
not be overlooked. I suggest that the ad-hoc international structure of the ICTR, its
location in Arusha, Tanzania, and the concurrent national efforts at justice are three
factors the were also important in shaping the successes and failures of the ICTR.
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Individual Criminal Accountability
The first indictment issued by the ICTR was confirmed in late November 1995.
In 2003, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1503 urging a
completion strategy for the Rwandan Tribunal.210 The Security Council called for a
resolution of trials by the end of 2008 and of all work by 2010. It soon became clear that
this time frame was unrealistic and the completion date for trials was revised. In a letter
dated 21 November 2008, the President of the ICTR assured the Security Council that the
Tribunal was on schedule to finish all trials by the end of 2009.211 Thus, the Rwanda
Tribunal is in progress as I write. As of 2 February 2009, 41 cases are concluded and 48
are in progress.212 The majority of cases brought before the ICTR involve more than one
accused. Currently, 11 indicted criminals are at large. In this section I present the facts
and figures of the ICTR. I begin with a discussion of the early months of the Tribunal, a
time when it struggled with lack of resources and subsequently the responsibility to takeon such an overwhelming task. I then introduce some of the most notable cases the ICTR
has presided over. I focus on what is known as the “Military I” trial.213 Military I is a
single case composed of four accused: Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, Anatole
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Nsengiyumva, Gratien Kabiligi and Aloys Ntabakuze.214 These men occupied positions
of varying superiority during the time period in which the genocide took place. I also
provide a summary of the trial of Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister of the interim
government in 1994. The conclusion of these trials helped contribute to the ICTR’s
success in achieving its goal of individual criminal responsibility.
In the early years of the Tribunal’s operation, resources were scarce. The
Security Council’s decision to link the ICTR with its predecessor in the former
Yugoslavia meant that the human resources needed for such an undertaking were
severely limited. The process of issuing indictments, calling witnesses and holding trials
was impaired by the shortage of staff. The Rwandan genocide involved such a massive
number of people and included such appalling destruction that careful investigations of
cases was paramount to the Tribunals’ ability to ensure fair and efficient trials. ICTR
operations in the first months were based in The Hague, while everything was prepared
for the move to Arusha, Tanzania. In June 1995, the Tribunal judges held the first
plenary session in The Hague.215 On 2 September 1998 Jean-Paul Akayesu became the
first individual convicted by the ICTR.216 Akayesu’s conviction was the first ever in
which rape was included as a form of genocide.
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The Military I trial,217 which only recently concluded, is the best example of
holding accountable those ‘most responsible’ for the events in Rwanda. The trial,
commenced on 2 April 2002. Military I is significant not only in its success at rendering
justice for crimes specific to Rwanda, but also as a much-needed signal that the ICTR
could be an effective judicial organ. Bagosora was tried alongside three others, all of
whom were accused of multiple counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
genocide.
Colonel Théoneste Bagosora was intimately involved in the planning and
execution of the genocide.218 The formal indictment of Bagosora et al. explains, “The
incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was a fundamental part of the plan…it was
articulated, before and during the genocide”.219 Colonel Bagosora was an avid opponent
of the Arusha Accords. In the days before the genocide Bagosora, Nsengiyumva,
Ntabukuze, and other members of the extremist Hutu wing of the government voiced
their belief that the complete elimination of the Tutsi was the only viable path to lasting
peace.220 All four men included in Military I distributed arms to the interhamwe and
other militias that carried out the brutal massacres from 7 April 1994 onwards. Starting in
early 1993, Nsengiyumva and other members of the military helped train these same
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militias.221 After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, Théoneste Bagosora
was in effective command of military and political affairs at the time of the genocide.
Thus, he was deemed responsible for the killings of Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana, numerous opposition leaders and the hundreds of thousands of civilians
murdered in 100 days. The Military I trial lasted six years and on 18 December 2008 a
judgment was handed down. Bagosora, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva were all found
guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and were subsequently
sentenced to life imprisonment.222
Eight years prior to the Military I convictions Jean Kambanda, the former Prime
Minister of Rwanda’s interim government from 8 April 1994 to 17 July 1994, appeared
before the ICTR. Kambanda’s trial, which began on 1 May 1998, was unique in that he
admitted guilt immediately.223 Kambanda’s guilty plea ensured a quick trial and a
sentence of life imprisonment was dictated on 4 September 1994. The decision of the
ICTR was evidence that no one, not even an acting head of state, was immune to
prosecution in the face of mass human rights atrocities.
The ICTR’s prosecution of those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes
committed in Rwanda is impressive considering the scale of the atrocities. Because it is
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literally impossible (and perhaps not advantageous224) to prosecute all those who had a
hand in the violence, the ICTR targets those who occupied high levels of command at the
time of the genocide. The devastated infrastructure of post-genocide Rwanda presents the
second greatest obstruction to the execution of individual accountability. The national
justice system, recognized by many scholars as severely limited before the genocide of
1994,225 was completely destroyed during the violence. Lawyers, judges, collegeeducated citizens and active members of the human rights community were
systematically killed. As a result the ICTR entered into a situation where Rwandan
citizens qualified to be employed by the Tribunal, were scarce. Although the Rwanda
Tribunal is international in structure, essential judicial activities such as conducting
investigations, collecting evidence, and gathering witness testimonial are necessarily
based out of Rwanda. The lack of trained personnel handicapped the ICTR’s ability to
efficiently complete the pre-trial stage of its prosecutions.
Fortunately, the timing of the ICTR greatly eased the aforementioned challenges.
Established in the aftermath of the killings, the Tribunal began its operations with the
acquiescence and active cooperation of the RPF government. In the context of fulfilling
the objective of individual accountability, the RPF’s control over military and political
affairs in Rwanda was a great advantage to the ICTR. The willingness of the RPF
government helped to mediate the hurdles presented by a collapsed infrastructure.226
Apprehending perpetrators was made considerably easier by the lack of active conflict,
and the ability of the Tribunal to carry out its operations without the constant threat of
224
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armed conflict helped to ensure that individual criminal responsibility was effectively
pursued. The ICTR’s most tangible accomplishment is its prosecution of high-level
officials who participated in the planning of the genocide. Bringing such important
suspects to trial helps to counter collective guilt that could be placed on the Hutu as a
whole. By focusing on individual accountability, especially the prosecution of top
leaders, single persons receive blame instead of entire sections of a population.227
The RPA military victory and the subsequent installation of the RPF government
effectively ended the genocide. However, it also prompted Hutu extremists who were not
captured by the military to flee into neighboring countries to avoid retribution for their
crimes. Mamdani estimates that over two million people crossed the Rwandan border
within a week of the RPF seizure of Kigali.228 Although not all who left Rwanda are
complicit in the genocide, many are and it is impossible for the ICTR to arrest these
people unless the countries in which they are now residing choose to relinquish them.
Even more troubling is the fact that many of these extremists entered refugee camps in
Uganda and Burundi where they continue to harbor anti-Tutsi sentiments. Some of these
Hutu extremists have formed armed militias and political alliances and proceeded to
launch cross border attacks on Rwandan civilians and the RPF government in Kigali.229
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto notes the negative impact,
Thousands of unarmed civilians have been killed across the border…in an
armed conflict involving several governments, including Rwanda, as well
as various armed opposition groups, including Rwandese interahamwe
militia and soldiers of the former Rwandese armed forces.230
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The political implications of this situation are immensely complicated. It is not within
the scope of this chapter to delve into such issues. Yet it is important to note that the
continued attacks against the RPF government and the government’s subsequent
responses will likely have future consequences for the stability of the Rwandan state.
Rule of Law
Due to the timing of the Tribunal, the ICTR’s second objective, re-establishing
the rule of law in Rwanda, has been the easiest to fulfill. The resolution of the violence
in Rwanda was such that this goal was, for all intents and purposes, achieved before the
Tribunal became active. The RPA’s military victory in Kigali led to the arrest and
imprisonment of some of the people most responsible for the planning and
implementation of the genocide. Akhavan explains, “the leading Rwandese perpetrators
of genocide were defeated militarily, removed from state institutions and positions of
leadership, and are either in refugee camps in neighboring countries or in exile
elsewhere.”231 Those who were placed in custody of the RPF were easily transferred for
trial in Arusha. The timing of the ICTR allowed time for the RPF government to
consolidate power and remove the guilty from public office. In stark contrast to the
situation in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTR was not faced with the task of locating and
investigating suspects in the midst of ongoing violence. The RPA’s seizure of Kigali in
mid-July ensured that any high-level Hutu extremists were ousted from positions of
power. Had violence been ongoing, the Tribunal’s responsibility to dismantle institutions
such as the radio stations inciting anti-Tutsi fervor, would have been severely limited.
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Enhancing and rebuilding the national judicial system is one of the most
important steps in establishing the rule of law in the aftermath of mass violence. Without
a functioning legal system it is unlikely that a new regime will retain credibility. A
strong judicial system allows the new regime to prosecute persons while maintaining a
high level of impartiality and legitimacy. The Rwandan judicial system is a topic that
warrants (and has received) much attention. In the time period since the end of the
genocide there have been serious failures on the part of the national judicial system. Due
process has been violated repeatedly and there are thousands upon thousands of suspects
in Rwandan prisons. The current state of the national judicial system is lamentable and
steps need to be taken to address its many failings. In spite of this, it is undeniable that if
the ICTR did not exist, the national judicial system would have collapsed under the sheer
number of suspects. Schabas explains that in the months after the genocide there was
danger that “the system will be at best distorted and at worst crushed by the demands of
prosecuting some 87,000 people for genocide.”232 The ICTR cannot and should not serve
as a tool to build the judicial system up from the ground. The Tribunal has however,
greatly alleviated the pressure on the Rwandan national system.233 Due to the mass
complicity in the genocide, thousands upon thousands of people face prosecution by the
national courts. The poor quality of Rwandan prisons and the long periods of detention
have already earned Rwanda criticism by human rights activists and international law
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experts. Although the ICTR is limited in the amount of people it can prosecute, its ability
to prosecute leaders (whose trials are often the most complicated and intensive) serves as
a pressure valve for the heavily overburdened national judicial system in Rwanda.234
If the Tribunal had been implemented in the midst of the genocide, the
establishment of rule of law would have been complicated exponentially. Mass violence
such as that which occurred in Rwanda defies all that is commonly recognized as part of
a lawful society. The mass participation in the genocide and the rate of killings was
evidence that the act of committing atrocities became the ‘normal’ course of action.235
Journalist Philip Gourevitch raises the questions, “What if…murder and rape become the
rule?” In the case of Rwanda, he concludes that “[d]uring the genocide, the work of the
killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land”.236
It is indisputable that if the ICTR attempted to pursue justice during such violence, it
would have failed miserably in its goal of re-establishing the rule of law.
The relatively stable political situation in Rwanda allowed the ICTR the
opportunity to achieve some measure of success in the pursuit of individual
accountability and re-establishment of rule of law. However, although the RPF
government was a boon to the Tribunal in some ways, the relationship between the
national government and the ICTR proved detrimental in other respects. If the ICTR is to
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successfully advance the fight against impunity, the issue of victor’s justice must be
carefully examined and adequately addressed.
It is essential that the justice the ICTR dispenses be perceived as legitimate. This
will be determined by its ability to render justice that is fair, efficient and impartial. The
post-genocidal government in Rwanda poses a major obstacle to this realization.
Scholars, advocates and critics alike, frequently reference victor’s justice as a serious
threat to the overall effectiveness of the ICTR. Zorbas notes that the concern is that, “the
RPF, which won a decisive military victory on the one hand…[and] put an end to the
genocide on the other, is erecting a veiled regime of victor’s justice and collective Hutu
stigmatization.”237 It is typical that a political transition follows a period of mass
violence. In the aftermath of extended atrocities this transition between an oppressor
regime and its successor is manifest in different ways. A smooth transition has much to
do with what principles and objectives the successor regime seeks. Does the new regime
want retaliation for past crimes? Is there a desire to prioritize national reconciliation over
legal justice? Will the new regime make an effort to incorporate all political parties in
justice efforts?
Jeremy Sarkin categorizes the RPF government’s transition to power as a one
based on the “overthrow model”. In this paradigm, “the dominant forces [Hutu
extremists] are staunchly opposed to reform and over time the opposition [RPF forces]
gains significant political strength while the authoritarian regime loses strength.”238 The
RPF government was not one based on the compromise and consent of warring factions
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(in this case Hutu extremists versus Tutsis). In 2000, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees commented that the RPF government has done little to
include Hutu in prominent positions within the administration and judicial system.239
The exclusion of Hutu from the RPF government reinforces a perception of
victor’s justice. This predominant view of bias on the part of the RPF government is
especially troubling given the nature of Rwanda’s post-genocidal society. Mark Drumbl
terms Rwanda’s postgenocidal society as dualist in nature. He states,
Rwanda can be studied as a dualist postgenocidal society in which the
Tutsi, the minoritarian victim group that historically has exerted
significant economic influence, controls power. The fundamental paradox
of a dualist postgenocidal society is that people who have suffered
unimaginable horrors, in Kant’s phrase, “cannot avoid living side by
side”.240
The necessity of coexistence between Hutu and Tutsi Rwandans underlie the threat that
the RPF government poses to the successful pursuit of justice. Mamdani frames this
dilemma as a question of “how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty
majority alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community.”241
The ICTR and the Rwandan government are closely linked in the minds of many
Rwandans. Individual accountability and the re-establishment of the rule of law
benefited from the RPF’s hold on power. Yet, the ICTR has also faced criticisms of
partiality. The ICTR may be perceived as too closely entwined with the RPF government
to render unbiased justice. On the surface, this view may be counter-intuitive since the
RPF government specifically requested the creation of an international tribunal in order
to avoid any accusations of victor’s justice. Yet, many Hutus believe that the RPF
239
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government was merely paying lip service to impartiality. Maogoto warns “that the ICTR
is seen by Hutus, as international punishment by the victors, Tutsis with the blessing and
support of the United Nations. Tutsis may themselves see the Tribunal and the genocide
trials they are conducting in Rwanda as their opportunity for revenge.”242 This is a deep
concern since victims and perpetrators alike must view the ICTR as a legitimate
instrument of justice. The ICTR’s failure to investigate and prosecute crimes committed
by RPF forces both during and after the genocide perpetuates this perception of victor’s
justice.
The ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction is restricted to 1 January 1994 through 31
December 1994. This limited time frame means that any war crimes committed by the
RPF forces or acts of retaliation by Tutsi civilians before or after this time, are excluded
from prosecution. This is troubling given the amount of evidence of such crimes. Jose
Alvarez explains, “the new Rwandan government’s effort to limit the ICTR’s jurisdiction
to offenses committed before July 1994, if intended to secure impunity for revenge
crimes committed by Tutsis, represents an example of an attempt to impose one-sided
‘victor’s justice’”.243 In Alison Des Forge’s authoritative report, Leave None to Tell the
Story: Genocide in Rwanda, she states, “The RPF killed thousands of civilians both
during the course of combat…and in the more lengthy process of establishing its control
throughout the country.”244 The crimes committed by the RPF, including the targeted
murders of Hutus, will not be investigated by the ICTR. The narrowed temporal
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jurisdiction impedes the ICTR’s ability to provide an official record that accurately
reflects the history of the events.245
Creation and distribution of historical record
Without considering the full spectrum of crimes, the historical account of the
genocide in Rwanda will only tell part of the story. The chances for reconciliation and
lasting peace decrease if Hutus in Rwanda and abroad feel that the ICTR is a tool the
RPF government is using to consolidate power. Ascertaining and acknowledging the truth
in the wake of mass atrocities is an essential forerunner to national reconciliation. In
recognition of this fact, the ICTR is responsible for the creation and dissemination of an
official and accurate historical record. As a form of legal justice, the Rwanda Tribunal
creates this record through public trials of perpetrators. Each trial involves the collection
and presentation of evidence, witness testimony, and arguments by the defense. These
factors each contribute to building a record of the genocide in Rwanda. The historical
record produced by the ICTR is admittedly limited. Unlike a truth and reconciliation
commission, prosecutorial accountability mechanisms cannot, nor do they seek to, create
a record that provides a fully rounded analysis of the context of conflict.
The lack of active conflict in Rwanda at the time of the ICTR’s implementation,
made fact-finding was made significantly easier. However, the existence of the
victorious RPF government has hindered the perceived legitimacy of the Tribunal’s
findings. If it is thought that one-sided justice is being pursued, there will be little chance
that the legal record will be deemed factual and authentic. The timing of the ICTR
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helped ease certain aspects of the Tribunal’s operations, but the factor of location had a
far greater impact on the outcome of this objective.
The geographic location of a tribunal such as the ICTR is a crucial aspect of the
process of uncovering truths and acknowledging past horrors. In ideal circumstances all
international tribunals would operate from the state in which the crimes took place. There
is an advantage to remaining close to the so-called ‘site of the crimes’. Steven Ratner
and Jason Abrams explain that when “trials take place in the country where the offenses
occurred the entire process becomes more deeply connected with the society, providing it
with the potential to create a strong psychological and deterrent effect on the
population.”246 The ICTR has encountered difficulties in creating an official record that
reaches a maximum number of people. That being said, in comparison to its sister
tribunal in The Hague, the ICTR comes much closer to success.
Arusha, Tanzania, is in relatively close proximity to the population and region
that experienced the 1994 atrocities. In light of the country’s shattered infrastructure after
the genocide, it was necessary the Tribunal be located outside the country. Despite the
necessity of its location, the ability of the ICTR to effectively access the citizens of
Rwanda (arguably the most important segment of its audience) is diminished because of
the Tribunal’s removal from the source location. Location is particularly important in
distributing information on the trials and proceedings that the ICTR is involved in. The
justice the ICTR renders must be open and accountable to the public. It is essential that
Rwandan citizens, both victims and perpetrators, continue to be aware of the ICTR’s
activities. In December 2008, the ICTR launched a new website including live
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broadcasts of trial proceedings. There have been greater attempts to actively engage the
Rwandan population through accessible written updates and radio transmissions. These
efforts show a growing awareness that disseminating information about the justice
procedures of the ICTR is essential to its effectiveness.
Deterrence
The ICTR has failed to have a deterrent effect. Measurements of deterrence
usually focus on two types—general and specific. General deterrence is determined by a
tribunal’s ability to deter future atrocities from occurring. These future atrocities are not
particular to a location; rather it is hoped that the threat of punishment will prevent others
from committing mass violations of human rights. Deterrence is an extremely elusive
goal. It is difficult to ascertain and measure a direct correlation between the existence of
a prosecutorial accountability mechanism and deterrence—both general and specific.
Ostensibly, in the case of Rwanda, success in the area of specific deterrence would mean
the prevention of crimes of revenge and/or continuation of killings by Hutu extremists.
The Rwanda Tribunal has had little if any deterrent effect on the occurrence of atrocities
in the world in general, and in Rwanda in specific. Two situations highlight this failure:
continued killings by the RPF government and a continuation and expansion of the
Rwandan conflict into neighboring states. Each of these situations, especially the
regional violence which contains traces of the past tension and violence in Rwanda, are
important topics in and of themselves. I focus primarily on how these two circumstances
illuminate the ICTY’s failure to deter future crimes.
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Scholars, journalists, and human rights groups have reported on politically
motivated killings by the RPF government in Kigali.247 These killings occurred during
the RPF take-over of Kigali and are reportedly continuing today. There is no evidence
that the existence of the ICTR is linked to a decrease in these attacks. There were not
huge numbers of retaliatory killings by civilians after the end of the genocide, but this has
less to do with the Tribunal than it does with the control exerted by the RPF government.
Hutu extremists across the border have not ceased armed attacks against Rwandan
civilians and the RPF government forces. In the neighboring Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), civilians are frequently killed by Hutu-extremists who fled Rwanda after
the end of the genocide.248 Maogoto notes, “The Rwandese government continues to
offer support to the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) part of the deal being
permission to conduct military operations in the Congolese territory against Hutu
extremists.”249 The ICTR was neither designed to nor is capable of ending regional
instability. Yet, as an organ created in the spirit of advancing human rights and
international criminal law, it was hoped that the justice rendered by the Rwanda Tribunal
would, through legal prosecutions, ease the strife between Hutu and Tutsi. In light of the
fact that Hutu extremists and the Rwandan government contribute to the escalating
violence in the region, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ICTR has done little in the
way of deterring future violence. Adam Roberts aptly notes that the “continuing bitter
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conflicts in the African Great Lakes region, including Hutu-Tutsi killings within Rwanda,
do not suggest that the Tribunal has yet had a significant effect”.250
Timing did not seem to influence the ICTR’s ability to achieve a deterrent effect.
In fact, the case study prompts me to argue that timing cannot even be convincingly
factored into the failure of the ICTR in this respect. Instead, I posit that the purely
international structure of the Tribunal combined with its relatively distant location,
proved to have a much more discernable affect on deterrence than timing did. The
structure of the ICTR was such that there was very little involvement by Rwandan actors.
By limiting participation in the judicial process to a foreign staff, the deterrent effect of
legal prosecutions was muted by a sense of disengagement between Rwandan citizens
and the ICTR’s search for justice. The location of the ICTR, Arusha, Tanzania, meant
that Rwandan citizens were distanced not only psychologically, but also physically.
Although Arusha is significantly closer to the site of the genocide than the ICTY’s base
in The Hague, the physical removal of the Tribunal may have contributed to a feeling that
the ICTR was not directly relevant to the Rwandan citizens. If the ICTR was perceived
as a abstract justice mechanism instead of a tribunal that was present in the everyday
lives of citizens, it seems that deterrence would be greatly hindered. If the RPF
government and Tutsis seeking retaliation, as well as those Hutu extremists still residing
in and around Rwanda, feel disengaged from the Tribunal’s justice processes, there will
unlikely be a deterrent effect strong enough to provide the impetus to cease continued
hostilities. Even before the ICTR was officially created, the Rwandan government
protested the suggestion that it be based in Tanzania. The government warned that the
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“deterrent effect of the trial and punishment will be lost if the trials were to held hundreds
of miles away from the scene of the crimes”.251 These are issues worth considering and
the above paragraph serves merely as an introduction. Numerous scholars specialize on
deterrence theory and I urge them to explore the influence that location and structure
have on the deterrent effect of prosecutorial mechanisms.
Attempts to measure the ICTR’s deterrent effect raises fascinating questions about
the moral implications of its timing. The ICTR was implemented after the genocide in
Rwanda, regardless of the fact that the UNSC, the body with the power to create such a
tribunal, was aware of the brutal killings from an early date. The question is raised: if
UNSC member states had intervened (most likely through increased UNAMIR troops) at
the first indication of ethnically motivated killing, would thousands of casualties been
prevented? It is troubling to think about the paradox presented by the creation of a court
to try individual perpetrators and deter future atrocities, implemented only after hundreds
of thousands of innocent people have been butchered while the world watched. My case
study of the ICTR leads me to conclude that the Tribunal’s establishment in the aftermath
of mass violence helped bring about the conditions necessary to achieve individual
criminal responsibility and rule of law. Creating a tribunal after mass violence may
contribute to its successes, yet if accountability mechanisms are not implemented even
when there is overwhelming evidence of mass human rights violations, and if they are
only employed after thousands of people are killed, tortured, and raped, what effect does
the decision to not employ accountability mechanisms have on the credibility of these
mechanisms and the advancement of human rights worldwide? This is not a question that
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this thesis attempts to answer. However, it is an important issue that must be considered
by scholars, advocates, and policy-makers. A discussion of timing and the potential
moral issues it raises warrants further research that would benefit from analysis by
Political Scientists, Sociologists, Philosophers and others across academic disciplines.
Conclusion
As the second international criminal tribunal established by the UNSC, the ICTR
provides a different context through which to examine how timing may have influenced
the outcome of such a prosecutorial accountability mechanism. The ICTR achieved
moderate success in realizing its objective to pursue individual criminal accountability
and re-establish rule of law in the wake of mass violence. This is due in large part to its
establishment in the aftermath of mass violence. This delayed timing helped alleviate
some of the immense challenges faced by the ICTY, a tribunal instituted during conflict.
The ICTR case indicates that implementing a tribunal in the aftermath of conflict allows
for certain elements to arise that contribute to its successful operation. The ICTR
benefited from a stable climate in which to pursue investigations, apprehend suspects,
and re-establish the rule of law. By the time the ICTR began operations, a relatively
secure government led by the RPF was installed. The cooperation of the government as
well as the government’s control of political and military affairs, proved advantageous to
the ICTR. The existence of the RPF government also created difficulties for the Tribunal.
Many Hutus in Rwanda are concerned that the RPF government is using the ICTR to
carry out retaliatory prosecutions that help them consolidate power and do not advance
justice or national reconciliation. It is essential that the ICTR’s staff and independent
groups (NGOs, IOs, and others) continue to monitor Rwandan citizens’ opinions on the
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justice rendered by the Tribunal. Perceptions of victor’s justice could severely damage
the ICTR’s ability to successfully pursue justice that is deemed legitimate and fair.
Despite the ICTR’s success in achieving the first two objectives, this case also
demonstrates that problems remain even when justice is pursued in the absence of
ongoing conflict. Like the ICTY, the Rwanda Tribunal struggled (and failed) to create
and disseminate an accurate historical record and to serve as a deterrent effect. Some of
the major problems plaguing the Yugoslav Tribunal, were due to the fact that it was
forced to operate in the midst of ongoing conflict. Yet, the case of the Rwanda Tribunal
indicates that the absence of conflict is not a cure-all. Due to this conclusion, I suggest
that the recently developed hybrid tribunals must be examined. In the next chapter I
present brief case studies of the Special Court in Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary
Chambers for the Courts of Cambodia. These studies will allow me to examine whether
or not hybrid structure has the potential to improve upon the Rwanda Tribunal.
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Chapter IV: Hybrid Tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia
Benefits and Drawbacks of Mixed Composition and Location
Introduction
The ICTY and ICTR represent the most widely recognized form of international
criminal justice—the ad hoc international tribunal. The case studies of these two
international tribunals revealed how the timing of a tribunal influences its ability to carry
out its objectives. The ICTY’s implementation in the midst of ongoing conflict resulted
in increased challenges to its effectiveness. The Yugoslav Tribunal struggled to perform
basic activities such as collecting evidence, due to the presence of conflict in the region.
The case of the ICTR demonstrated that in the absence of conflict, some of the challenges
faced by the ICTY were alleviated. However, the ICTR case study also showed that
despite some improvements, problems remain. The ICTY and ICTR are both set to
conclude in 2010, and while they are still relevant and deserving of close scrutiny, a new
generation of tribunals has emerged. Since it is clear that a change in timing cannot
dispense with all challenges, proponents of international criminal justice must consider
factors beyond timing that may help increase tribunals’ successes.
This chapter looks at the hybrid tribunals located in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
Similar to the ICTR, both of these tribunals were implemented in the aftermath of mass
violence. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established shortly after
conflict ended, whereas the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
was implemented nearly three decades after the end of conflict.252 These two hybrid
tribunals offer an effective method of comparison to the ICTR. I argue that like the
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ICTR, the hybrid tribunals benefit in certain ways from the absence of conflict. The brief
case studies of the SCSL and ECCC allow me to examine other factors, especially
structure, and their influence on the tribunals’ ability to achieve the four objectives of
prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. Interestingly, the case of the ECCC lends an
added element to the study of how timing influences a tribunal’s effectiveness. Although
the absence of conflict is beneficial to the ECCC, the three-decade delay between the
Khmer Rouge atrocities and the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, negatively
influences its ability to collect evidence, gather witness testimony, and indict all
individuals involved in the atrocities. The case of the ECCC suggests that establishing a
tribunal in the aftermath of conflict is beneficial—up to a point. As the ECCC case
demonstrates, when there is a significant gap in time between the relevant atrocities and
the accountability mechanism, the advantages of operating in the absence of conflict, are
somewhat tempered.
The ICTR case demonstrated that absence of conflict does not solve all problems.
Hybrid tribunals have the potential to fix some of the challenges that implementation in
the aftermath of conflict, could not. Specifically, the hybrid structure offers to potential
improvements to a tribunal’s effectiveness. First, the mixed composition of hybrid
tribunals allows for cooperation and collaboration between foreign and domestic judges.
This interaction could potentially help augment national judicial systems that are often
weakened after periods of mass violence (or never strong in the first place). Second, thus
far hybrid tribunals have been located in the country where the relevant crimes took
place. This proximity to the most affected population has the potential to increase the
likelihood of achieving two objectives in particular: the creation and distribution of an
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accurate historical record, and the deterrence of future atrocities. Before delving into an
assessment of the SCSL and ECCC it is important to note that these case studies are brief
and do not represent exhaustive research. Rather, the case studies of the SCSL and
ECCC allow me to conclude this project by broadening the scope of study to a different,
and more recent, form of tribunal. The emergence of this ‘second generation’ of tribunal
necessitates my research be extended.253
Overview of Hybrid Tribunals
Currently, hybrid tribunals exist in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and
Cambodia254. I focus on the tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia for two reasons.
First, The Special Court in Sierra Leone is the most widely studied hybrid tribunal in
existence today. In comparison to the hybrid tribunals established in East Timor and
Kosovo, there is an extensive amount of literature on the SCSL. Given the limited
number of hybrid tribunals I felt it to be important to choose one that provided a
substantial amount of research on which to base my conclusions. Second, I focus on the
ECCC because it is the most recent hybrid tribunal to begin proceedings. The
Extraordinary Chambers became fully operational at the beginning of 2009, and is thus a
highly newsworthy topic.255 In the following pages I provide a brief overview of the
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hybrid structure. I then present the two brief case studies on the Special Court and the
Extraordinary Chambers. I frame my analysis in terms of the same four objectives used
to conduct my studies of the ICTY and ICTR.256
I focus on three potential advantages that hybrid tribunals enjoy relative to purely
international tribunals.257 First, all existing internationalized tribunals are located in the
country in which the violations of human rights took place.258 Unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, these courts are in close proximity to the population most affected by the mass
violence. The case studies of the ICTY and ICTR, demonstrated the problems raised by
the distance between legal prosecutions and the most affected population. Both the ICTY
and ICTR suffer from legitimacy problems and both, particularly the Yugoslav Tribunal,
have struggled to effectively educate the affected populations about the activities and new
developments of the tribunals. Second, the structure of hybrid tribunals results in a
prosecutorial body with mixed composition. By employing both international and
domestic judges, there is an increased chance of contributing to the training of local
judges—thereby augmenting the national judiciary, which is weak or virtually nonexistent in the aftermath of mass violence. Unlike the purely international composition of
The UN essentially built the East Timorese judicial system. Although this is a fascinating case, I do not
think it best exemplifies hybrid tribunals understood as a joint effort between a country and the UN. I do
not examine Kosovo because in many respects, it is regarded as a failure. Scholars and human rights
organizations have cited widespread bias, lack of trained personnel, and inconsistent trial standards.
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the ICTY and ICTR, hybrid tribunals’ inclusion of foreign and domestic elements help
connect the legal process to the people who suffered the atrocities. Finally, hybrid
tribunals offer a chance to pursue justice “on the cheap”.259 The 2008-2009 budget for the
Yugoslav Tribunal is estimated at $342,332,300. In January 2008, the UNSC approved a
budget of $267,356,200 for the Rwanda Tribunal. In contrast, the Special Court in Sierra
Leone has an estimated cost of $40,684,600 for 2009-2010.260 The hybrid tribunal in
Cambodia will cost approximately 20 million dollars, although that cost is expected to
rise.261 My brief case studies show that it is not yet clear if the three potential benefits of
hybrid tribunals—location, mixed composition, and reduced cost—will, in fact, fulfill
their potential. However, I believe this structure will remain a viable option for
prosecuting perpetrators of mass atrocities.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into force in 2002. Some scholars
suggest that this development will lessen the need for other types of tribunals.262 I
disagree. Despite the existence of the ICC, there are a number of reasons why I argue
that hybrid tribunals will be implemented again. First, due to provisions set out in the
Rome Statute, the ICC is unable to prosecute crimes committed before 2002.263
Additionally, until the ICC gains widespread support, especially from the United States,
it may be hindered in its ability to carry out its objectives. The ICC enjoys support from
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many Western countries, but due to its lack of a self-contained enforcement mechanism it
is dependent upon other states to help with apprehending and extraditing suspects. The
ICC has great potential and may well be an effective and efficient judicial organ in the
future. It will no doubt be studied extensively in the years to come, especially in light of
the recent arrest warrant issued for President Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan. Nevertheless,
scholars and experts must not be blinded to the potential contributions of hybrid tribunals.
Extended study of hybrid tribunals is central to keeping abreast of new developments in
international law. The desire to end impunity for perpetrators of mass human rights
violations cannot be fulfilled with a ‘one size fits all’ solution. In order to advance
justice through tribunals, a dialogue in the field of human rights and across academic
disciplines must continue. Difficult questions must be asked. My brief examination of
the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia seeks to start this discussion.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone
The conflict that led to the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) lasted for over a decade, spanning from March 1991-2002.264 This extremely
complex conflict began when a rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) entered Sierra Leone through Liberia. The Sierra Leonean government, headed at
the time by Joseph Saidu Momoh of the All People’s Congress (APC) was quickly
deposed, not by the RUF but by a group within the Sierra Leonean army led by Sergeant
Valentine Strasser. Strasser pledged to fight against the RUF and established the
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National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).265 The war in Sierra Leone involved
numerous actors including formal armies, private security firms, rebel groups, and
citizen-led militias.266 On 25 May 1997, RUF forces entered the capital city of Freetown
and formed the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). The AFRC immediately
announced Operation No Living Thing, a campaign of violence whose intention was to
kill civilians and destroy Freetown.267 The pro-government Civil Defense Force (CDF)
also perpetrated numerous violations of human rights. By 2002, more than 50,000 people
were dead. Due to widespread amputations, sexual violence, and forced conscription of
child soldiers, the violence in Sierra Leone gained worldwide media coverage. After a
few failed attempts to broker an end to the conflict, the RUF agreed to a ceasefire in
November 2000. The resulting Abuja Agreement led to a fragile peace in Sierra
Leone.268 The brutality of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone prompted immediate
discussion about the possibility of creating a tribunal to prosecute perpetrators.
The SCSL is a treaty-based tribunal, formed in a joint effort between the
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations.269 Its treaty-based status
distinguishes it from the ICTY and ICTR, both of which were created under the Chapter
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VII powers of the United Nations.270 The SCSL is set to prosecute crimes committed
after 30 November 1996. The end-date to the Court’s temporal jurisdiction has been left
open ended. This limited temporal jurisdiction resulted in part from the minimal
resources afforded to the SCSL. In contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, the Court in Sierra
Leone is funded entirely by voluntary donations.271 As a hybrid tribunal, the SCSL
combines aspects of domestic and international law. Despite the mixed elements of law,
the Special Court is not part of the domestic legal system—it is its own entity. The
combination of international judges appointed by the UN Secretary-General and judges
appointed by the Sierra Leonean government results in a court of mixed composition. The
Special Court is based in Freetown, Sierra Leone. As of 25 February 2009, the SCSL has
convicted three senior leaders of the RUF, three senior leaders of the AFRC, two CDF
leaders, and is in the midst of further trials.272
Ostensibly, hybrid tribunals are the best of both worlds.273 The domestic element
gives the affected population greater ownership of the pursuit of justice. The international
component boosts perceived legitimacy, augments the national judicial system, and
advances international humanitarian law. Chandra L. Sriram explains that hybrid courts
represent “an attempt to address the limitations of domestic and of international models,
270
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utilizing a complex mix (determined on a case-by-case basis) of domestic and
international law and domestic and international judges and staff.”274 Unfortunately, it is
highly debatable whether the mixed nature of the Court has added significantly to its
effectiveness. This is in part why it deserves continued research. My case studies of the
ICTY and ICTR revealed the timing’s influence on an international court. Like the ICTR,
the SCSL was implemented in the aftermath of conflict, and thus enjoys some of the
same benefits: access to evidence, witnesses, improved security for tribunal staff, greater
interaction with the most affected population. However, I argue that the hybrid structure
of the SCSL has an even greater influence on its effectiveness than the absence of
conflict. This is due to two elements of hybridity: mixed composition, and location.275
Due to the brief nature of my studies I only examine certain aspects of the influences of
structure and location on the four objectives sought by prosecutorial accountability
mechanisms. I indicate what these elements are in each section.
Individual criminal accountability
Like the ICTR, the SCSL276 was created in the aftermath of mass violence. The
basic operations of the SCSL were thus improved in much the same way as the ICTR.
Activities such as collecting evidence and gathering witness testimony, both essential to
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an effective tribunal were more easily conducted due to the absence of conflict. Two
elements of hybrid structure—the mixed composition of the court and the location of the
tribunal—have the potential to alleviate some of the challenges that the timing of the
ICTR, could not.
All existing hybrid courts are located in the country where the mass violence took
place. The SCSL’s base of operations in Freetown, allows it the benefit of closer
proximity to evidence and witness testimony.277 Even more importantly, this information
is easily accessible because of the mixed composition of the Special Court. The
hybridized structure of the SCSL results in a staff composed of both foreign and domestic
employees. The inclusion of local actors, who are familiar with the language, traditions,
and history, makes the gathering of evidence and witness testimony more efficient. The
mixed composition of the Special Court helps alleviate those challenges encountered by
the ICTR in its early years. Unfortunately, the potential benefits of the structure of the
SCSL have also proved to be drawbacks in other areas.
Perhaps the two greatest obstacles to the SCSL’s successful pursuit of individual
criminal accountability arise due to its lack of Chapter VII powers and its voluntary
funding mechanism. The ICTR and ICTY enjoyed Chapter VII powers, a provision that
made obligatory cooperation by third-party states. Due to the lack of these powers, the
SCSL’s ability to apprehend suspects that have fled the borders of Sierra Leone is
severely diminished. The Special Court cannot depend upon the cooperation of third
party states, “which would be bound to surrender persons within the court’s
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jurisdiction”278. This curtailment of power hinders the SCSL’s ability to achieve its
objective of individual criminal responsibility. Equally as important as the lack of
Chapter VII powers, is the lack of sufficient, reliable funding for the Special Court.
The decision to fund the SCSL based on voluntary contributions was made in
large part because of massive cost incurred by the ICTY and ICTR.279 Relying on
voluntary contributions by United Nations member states necessarily results in a reduced
mandate for the SCSL.280 The Special Court will likely prosecute only fifteen to twenty
individuals, thereby making any successes in pursuing individual criminal accountability,
limited.281
Rule of law
Proponents of hybrid tribunals argue that one of their greatest benefits lies in their
ability to strengthen the domestic judicial system, which is weakened or destroyed after a
period of mass violence.282 Throughout this project I have evaluated two aspects of rule
of law—the first is a tribunal’s ability to dismantle institutions implicated in the
perpetration of the atrocities, the second is to augment and support the national judicial
system. In the interest of keeping this case study brief I focus solely on the SCSL’s
ability to enhance the Sierra Leonean judicial system. Similar to the evaluation of
individual criminal responsibility, the SCSL’s success at achieving rule of law hinges on
the two factors of location and structure.
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The Special Court’s location gives it an advantage over the purely international
tribunals, which were geographically distant from the relevant region. Local outreach
programs, which are meant to educate the general population about the proceedings of the
Special Court, are much easier to carry out because of the proximity of the SCSL to the
Sierra Leonean people. By facilitating local outreach, it is much easier for the SCSL to
“build basic legal capacity, to explain the role of the prosecutions and the procedure, and
to include the rationale for due process and the need for defense attorneys.”283
One of the major failures of the ICTR, was its inability to effectively engage those
working within the Rwandan domestic legal system. Although the existence of the ICTR
helped lessen the workload faced by the national judiciary, it did little to train local
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers in international humanitarian law. The mixed
composition of the SCSL helps to counter this shortcoming. The involvement of
international and domestic personnel raises the chances that the Sierra Leonean people
involved with the domestic judicial system will benefit from the expertise that
international judges bring to the hybrid structure.284 The ability for the SCSL to
successfully pursue rule of law is, thus far, positively influenced by its hybrid structure.
Capacity building efforts are enhanced when local and international necessarily consult
one another during the course of investigations and trials. The mixed composition of the
SCSL increases its potential to have a lasting positive effect on the Sierra Leonean
judicial system.

283
284

Sriram, “Wrong-sizing Justice,” 498.
Ibid., 499.

121

Creation and distribution of historical record
Location proves the most significant influence on the creation and dissemination
of an accurate historical record. The SCSL bases its operation out of Freetown, the site
of some of the most brutal violence of the conflict. Gathering witness testimony is one of
the most important factors in the creation of an accurate historical record. The Court’s
proximity allows for easier access to Sierra Leonean people who suffered from or
participated in the atrocities. By locating the Court in Freetown, the SCSL avoids the
costs and difficulties associated with transfer of witnesses to a distant location. Perhaps
most importantly, the location of the Court makes the dissemination of information
regarding the trials and proceedings considerably easier. The outreach program
employed by the SCSL is more effective than its counterparts in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. Sierra Leoneans, especially those who reside in Freetown, are in constant
proximity to the Court and its activities. Trials are open to the public and information is
readily available. The activities of the SCSL are far more open and accessible to the
Sierra Leonean people than the ICTR was to Rwandan citizens. In April 2008, the Office
of Outreach and Public Affairs was established to increase interaction and understanding
between Sierra Leoneans and the Special Court. To date, the outreach program for the
Special Court has conducted surveys documenting Sierra Leonean perceptions of the
SCSL, held video screenings, utilized radio and television programming to broadcast
trials, and training of domestic legal personnel.285
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The mixed composition of the SCSL boosts the Court’s ability to create and
distribute an accurate legal record. Domestic and international judges, prosecutors, and
other staff work side by side to gather information, hold trials, and publish their outcome.
Domestic personnel, many of whom resided in Sierra Leone during the conflict, are
familiar with Sierra Leonean history and culture and prove valuable in translating witness
testimony and collecting evidence.
Deterrence
It is not yet clear whether the SCSL will have a deterrent effect. Trials are
ongoing and thus far it is difficult to assess what factors play a role in determining this
outcome. There is not enough concrete evidence to do anything other than offer
informed conjectures. I suggest that the Special Court will, like the ICTR and ICTY
before it, be unable to achieve a deterrent effect. This failure will be hastened due to its
under-funding and lack of Chapter VII enforcement powers. Akhavan astutely observes,
“Post-mortem justice without a corresponding commitment of…political and economic
resources significantly dilutes the message of accountability and undermines the longterm viability of preventing crimes.”286 It may be that in the search for a less expensive
alternative to the ICTY and ICTR, the UN helped create a mechanism that will have little
or no power to deter future crimes.
The influence of the hybrid structure of the SCSL is largely positive. Although
difficult to measure quantitatively, by locating the Tribunal within the country where the
atrocities took place, the likelihood of its activities reaching the affected population are
increased. Partial ownership of the Tribunal on the part of the Sierra Leonean people,
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suggests a greater ability for the SCSL to effectively disseminate information on
proceedings, indictments, and convictions. Alain Pellet expounds on the advantages of
proximity. A hybrid tribunal such as the SCLS enjoys “proximity to the place where the
crime has been committed, proximity to the evidence, proximity to the population more
directly concerned.”287 The separation between the SCSL and the domestic judiciary
lessens the likelihood that government and political influence will influence the Court’s
decisions. 288 The hybrid structure of the SCSL does not address all the shortcomings of
the ICTR. As is evident even through my cursory case study of the SCSL, the hybrid
structure brings problems of its own. Lack of funding and no enforcement powers may
hobble its ability to effectively pursue justice. Despite these weaknesses however, the
SCSL demonstrates that hybrid structure does address some of the major concerns raised
by the ICTR.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
From 1975-1979, the Khmer Rouge regime289 led a campaign of starvation,
forced labor, torture and killing, which resulted in approximately 1.7 million deaths—
nearly a quarter of the entire population.290 The Khmer Rouge targeted political
opponents and carried out frequent summary executions. Despite the widespread
atrocities and brutal nature of the regime, no Khmer Rouge leader was ever prosecuted
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for crimes.291 Finally, in 1997, the Cambodian government requested that the UN assist
them in creating a tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. The ECCC has
the jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.292
A series of disagreements between the UN and the Cambodian government regarding the
composition of the court led to protracted negotiations. It was not until 13 May 2003 that
such a mechanism was created.293 Thirty years after the demise of the Khmer Rouge
regime, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is finally
operational.294 The ECCC is located on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, the capital city of
Cambodia.
Like the Special Court the ECCC is a hybrid tribunal that mixes international and
domestic law. However, while the SCSL is neither fully nor part of the United Nations,
the ECCC is considered a part of the Cambodian judicial system.295 Although the
process of establishing the ECCC began in 1997, a settlement agreeable to both parties
was difficult to reach due to the Cambodian government’s insistence that domestic judges
retain a majority in the tribunal.296 In contrast, the UN desired a tribunal that would have
a majority of international judges, a safeguard to potential political influence over the
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decisions of the Court. The compromise that resulted in the creation of the ECCC
allowed Cambodian judges to occupy a majority in the two chambers of the Court—the
Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court Chamber.297 In turn, the UN was allowed to opt
out of its role in the ECCC if corruption and government influence became apparent.298
The final agreement also mandated a ‘supermajority’ vote. Any decision made by the
Chambers requires a majority of judges plus one. This provision ensures that at least one
international judge supports Court decisions.299 Currently, the ECCC has five suspects in
custody, all over the age of 66.300 The trial of the first defendant, Kiang Guek Eav
(known as Duch), is in the pre-trial stage and is set to commence on the 30 March
2009.301
Like the ICTR, the ECCC was implemented in the aftermath of conflict.
However, the timing of the two (a month-long delay in the case of Rwanda and a decadelong delay in Cambodia), can hardly be equated. Like the ICTR and SCSL, the
Extraordinary Chambers benefits from operating in the absence of conflict. However, the
almost three-decade gap between the Khmer Rouge atrocities and the creation of the
ECCC tempers these benefits. Thus, although I argue that structure of the ECCC proves
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most influential, timing also has influence on the Court’s effectiveness. Due to the time
lag between the time when the atrocities were committed and the tribunal established,
some of the most prominent members of the Khmer Rouge have died or are aged and
suffering from health problems.302 Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge regime, died
in April 1999, and will not be facing posthumous prosecution.303 There are also concerns
that important evidence in the three decades since the atrocities were committed. Despite
these influences, the hybrid structure of the ECCC proves to be a greater influence on its
effectiveness. The location of the Court, and its structure, in particular the provision
ensuring that Cambodian judges maintain a majority in both the Trial Chamber and the
Supreme Court Chamber, exercise the most influence on the effectiveness of the ECCC.
In the next sections I assess the influences of location and structure on the ECCC’s ability
to achieve its four objectives.
Individual criminal accountability
The SCSL exists separate from the Sierra Leonean legal system. This does not
hold true in the case of the ECCC, which is officially part of the domestic legal system of
Cambodia. Ideally, this status would give Cambodians greater ownership over the
Extraordinary Chambers’ proceedings. Thus far however, the decision to establish the
ECCC as part of the domestic legal system may prove to be its greatest weakness. Undue
political influence exerted by the Cambodian government is the primary concern in
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bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. The fact that Cambodian judges retain a
majority in the ECCC makes this concern even more powerful and valid. Evidence
gathered by human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, as well as a report issued
by the Secretary-General indicate that corruption is widespread in the national judicial
system of Cambodian.304 The Cambodian judicial system, although officially independent
from government influence, continues to be under the control of executive powers.
Suzannah Linton observes, “the design [of the ECCC] is such that there is virtually
nothing that can be done…without the approval of the Royal Government of Cambodia,
directly or through those of its officials involved in the process.”305 This dangerous lack
of judicial independence seems likely to severely undermine the ECCC’s ability to
achieve its goal of individual accountability. If the Cambodian judges choose to exert
politically motivated influence on the Court proceedings, decisions handed down by the
ECCC will lose legitimacy.
Timing has different effects in the case of the ECCC than in the ICTR, but it is
clear that it continues to exert influence on the search for individual criminal
responsibility. The pursuit of individual accountability is hindered by the huge delay in
establishing the ECCC. The SCSL and ECCC were both established in the aftermath of
conflict. Yet, the timing of the ECCC may negatively influence its ability to achieve the
objective of individual criminal accountability. Abrams and Ratner explain the impact of
timing:
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the length of time since the events and the relative paucity of
records maintained by the regime seriously hamper the
development and credibility of evidence. Memories will have
faded; appearances will have changed; much physical evidence
will no longer be available; and many witnesses are likely to be
dead, difficult to locate, or afraid to provide information.306
Due to the decades long gap between the Khmer Rouge regime and the creation of the
ECCC, many of the most notorious perpetrators are dead or very old. The five
perpetrators who have been charged are well into old-age, the foremost leader of the
Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, is deceased, and many thousands of participants in the killings
will not be brought to trial.
Rule of law
Early in the process a United Nations Group of Experts, responsible for
investigating the need for a tribunal, concluded that “the Cambodian judiciary presently
lacks three key criteria for a fair and effective judiciary: a trained cadre of judges,
lawyers and investigators; adequate infrastructure; and a culture of respect for the
process.”307 The hope that a hybridized judicial organ such as the ECCC can contribute to
strengthening the future of the Cambodian judicial system has not yet been realized. The
potential benefits of the ECCC’s location and mixed composition are overshadowed by
the many challenges these factors present. If the ECCC is to achieve its objective of rule
of law, it must first overcome a corrupt and inefficient national judicial system. Due to
the fact that Cambodian judges retain the majority in both of the ECCC’s chambers, there
is a danger that the structure of the Court will obstruct its ability to augment the national
judicial system.
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In October 2005, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human
Rights in Cambodia reported that the “[t]he judiciary continued to be subject to executive
interference and open to corruption.”308 As in the case of the SCSL, there is hope that the
ECCC will help alleviate some of the problems plaguing the national judiciary. Sarah
Williams states,
The deployment of international judges and personnel may help to
improve the population’s perception of the independence of the judiciary,
while creating a small body of Cambodian judges and personnel that have
had experience both in operating within an independent and impartial
environment and in applying international legal standards.309
Unfortunately, there is little chance of the ECCC contributing to capacity building and
judicial training if corruption is rampant in the national legal system. The location of the
ECCC means that the Cambodian government has easier access to judges involved in the
process. Additionally, it is not yet apparent that Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former midlevel member of the Khmer Rouge, is truly committed to the success of the ECCC.310
Government resistance to the Court could severely undermine its ability to achieve a
justice that is deemed legitimate and impartial. The case of Cambodia exhibits the danger
of establishing mixed composition tribunals when the domestic judiciary suffers from
widespread corruption, inefficiency and/or training.
The ECCC is not yet far enough along in the process to know if the corruption
within the judicial system will be solved by the interaction between national and
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international judges or if the corruption will lead to trials that will be perceived as
illegitimate and biased.
Creation and distribution of historical record
In light of the challenges presented by the structure of the Extraordinary
Chambers, the ECCC’s greatest achievement may be its ability to reveal the violent
history of Cambodia—a history that is rarely taught in schools, and that many young
people are almost entirely unaware of.311 A recent publication by the Documentation
Centre of Cambodia explains the potential benefits of the ECCC trials. The report states,
“Hearing perpetrators, eyewitnesses, experts, and court officials elaborate upon the
reasons for the atrocities will help Cambodian survivors achieve a greater degree of
historical and personal closure”.312 The benefits of locating the ECCC in Cambodia
mirror those experienced by the SCSL. Proximity to the affected population is important
for the creation of an historical record that is accessible to a general audience. There are
also hopes that locating the ECCC in Cambodia will confer some manner of legitimacy
on the Court. Tara Urs notes however, that proximity does not necessarily lead to
perceived legitimacy.313
Deterrence
The ECCC has only recently started proceedings and thus it is too early to fully
judge the deterrent effect of the tribunal. Interestingly, timing seems the most likely
factor to influence the ECCC’s ability to achieve its objective of deterrence. The
Documentation Centre of Cambodia notes that the significant time gap between the
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Khmer Rouge regime and the establishment of the ECCC may undermine any potential
deterrent effect.
The ECCC is just beginning its proceedings and thus fully formed conclusions are
difficult to make at this stage in the process. Yet, even before the Extraordinary
Chambers became operational, concerns were raised about its structure and composition.
The greatest impediment to the effectiveness of the ECCC is the possibility of
government influence over the trials. Trials have only recently begun and there is already
well-founded suspicion that the Cambodian government will attempt to intervene in the
Court’s decisions. The composition of the court is such that Cambodian judges have the
majority. This is concerning given reports that the domestic judicial system is weakened
by corruption and inefficiency.
Conclusion
The brief case studies of the SCSL and ECCC do not fully engage with all the
issues surrounding hybrid tribunals. Nevertheless, even a cursory case study reveals that
the complexities of international criminal justice are far from resolved. There are high
hopes within parts of the human rights community that hybrid tribunals will offer a new
and improved approach to the prosecution of mass human rights violations. Whereas the
distant locations of the ICTY and ICTR impeded their ability to adequately inform the
affected population of ongoing proceedings and new developments, the hybrid tribunals’
proximity to the scene of the crime may help boost the legitimacy of the justice rendered.
Although structure certainly presented problems for the operations of the ICTY
and ICTR, it was not the major factor that impacted its successes and failures. The brief
study of the hybrid courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia demonstrate that the structure of
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prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, particularly its mixture of international and
domestic judges, greatly influences the courts’ effectiveness. The SCSL and ECCC have
the potential to represent a new type of tribunal that is more cost efficient, less
bureaucratic, and more connected to the population most affected by the crimes the courts
seek to prosecute, than the international tribunals that preceded them. It is clear however,
that hybrid tribunals do not solve all the weaknesses associated with the ICTY and ICTR.
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CONCLUSION
The 20th century witnessed multiple occurrences of mass human rights violations,
most notably the Holocaust. As evidenced by the mass violence in Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 21st century has not ushered in an era in which
human rights are universally protected. Nevertheless, restorative and retributive justice is
being pursued through numerous types of accountability mechanisms. This project
focuses on prosecutorial accountability mechanisms, and emerges from scholarly
developments in the field of human rights, international criminal justice, and retributive
justice. Pursuing justice for mass violations of human rights presents multiple
challenges. Thus far, the ‘perfect’ justice mechanism does not exist. Due to the many
weaknesses of the prosecutorial accountability mechanisms employed in the past, the
search for an effective tribunal must continue.
A truly effective tribunal must achieve the four objectives of prosecutorial
accountability mechanisms. These are: 1) to pursue individual criminal accountability; 2)
to re-establish rule of law; 3) to create and distribute an accurate historical record; and 4)
to deter future atrocities from being committed. These objectives are central to the pursuit
of justice in the wake of mass human rights violations. Pursuing justice is not an easy
task however. Tribunals confront numerous challenges, and in order to achieve the four
objectives they must be able to do the following: initiate preliminary investigations,
collect evidence, gather witness testimony, apprehend suspects, access the most affected
population, disable institutions that contributed to the perpetration of atrocities, support
or augment the domestic legal system, and hold fair and efficient trials. In order for a
tribunal to effectively conduct these activities, it must employ judges, translators,
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prosecutors, defense lawyers, others. This staff must be competent and well trained.
Effective tribunals must also have sufficient funding and resources to conduct
investigations, apprehend and extradite suspects, and pay staff and personnel. The
demands on tribunals charged with prosecuting individuals for human rights violations
are abundant, and the pursuit of justice is difficult in all circumstances.
Multiple factors influence the overall effectiveness of a tribunal. This project
develops from the desire to fill a gap in the literature on human rights, justice
mechanisms, and retributive justice. Scholarship in these fields tends to overlook the
significant impact that active conflict has on a tribunal’s effectiveness. In this project, I
conducted in-depth studies of the ICTY and ICTR and brief case studies of the hybrid
tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. The case studies of the ICTY and ICTR
demonstrate how the circumstance in which a tribunal is implemented influences its
ability to achieve certain of the four objectives. The case studies of the Special Court in
Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia are examples of
a new type of tribunal, the structure of which offers a potential salve to some of the
weaknesses of the ad hoc international tribunals that preceded them. My findings for
each of the case studies are presented below.
ICTY case study
In the case of the ICTY, the ongoing conflict in the territories of the former
Yugoslavia disrupted the Tribunal’s ability to achieve the four objectives. Even before
the ICTY was officially created, the conflict raging in the former Yugoslavia prompted a
debate on the seemingly incompatible goals of peace and justice. Specifically, the
ongoing conflict and continuing atrocities negatively influenced the ICTY’s ability to

135

conduct the following activities: initiate investigations, locate and collect evidence,
gather witness testimony, and effectively distribute information on the Tribunal. The
ongoing conflict also dictated the location of the Tribunal. Due to the destruction
wrought by the conflict and the lack of security, the UN Security Council decided to base
the ICTY in The Hague. All of these complications significantly impacted the overall
effectiveness of the ICTY. Ultimately, the case study of the ICTY helped illustrate how
the presence of conflict influenced its ability to achieve its objectives and maximize its
overall effectiveness.
ICTR case study
The ICTR was implemented in the aftermath of mass violence. Thus, the Rwanda
Tribunal provides a case through which to determine how absence of conflict influenced
the ICTR’s effectiveness. The delayed timing of the ICTR was significant in that it
allowed for certain conditions to arise that proved favorable to the ICTR’s operations.
The absence of conflict allowed for the following: the installation of a new and stable
government, increased security for tribunal staff and personnel, and better access to
evidence and witnesses. The case of the ICTR demonstrates that its establishment in the
absence of conflict, allowed it to avoid some of the obstacles confronted by its sister
tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. The conditions that arose due to the absence of conflict
specifically facilitated the ICTR’s ability to pursue individual accountability and reestablish the rule of law.
The ICTR benefited greatly from the existence of the RPF government. The
government’s control over the military and political affairs in the country eased the
ICTR’s ability to conduct investigations, collect evidence, and apprehend perpetrators.
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When the RPF successfully deposed the Hutu-extremist government, they also removed
from office and arrested numerous high-level officials involved in the genocide. This
was a boon to the ICTR, because the task of re-establishing rule of law was significantly
diminished due to the RPF’s actions. The ICTR’s establishment in the absence of conflict
helped it succeed in certain respects. However, the timing of the ICTR did not alleviate
all the problems apparent in the ICTY.
Even in the absence of conflict, the Rwanda Tribunal was far from perfect. The
main obstacle to the ICTR’s ability to create and distribute an historical record resulted
from the decision to base the ICTR’s operations from Arusha, Tanzania. Although the
distance between Rwandan citizens and the Tribunal was less than the distance between
the population in the former Yugoslavia and The Hague, its removed proved to be a
negative influence. Lack of engagement with the most affected population impeded the
overall effectiveness of the Rwanda Tribunal. Additionally, like the Yugoslav Tribunal
before it, the Rwanda Tribunal failed to have any discernable effect on deterring future
crimes in the region and the world. The findings prompted by the ICTR indicate that
although the timing of a tribunal is significant in some ways, it does not alleviate all the
weaknesses of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Due to the many imperfections
of the ICTR, I suggest that the newest form of tribunal, hybrid tribunals, provide the next
best chance for improving the effectiveness of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms.
SCSL and ECCC case studies
The case studies of the ICTR and ICTY led me to conclude that the circumstances
in which a tribunal operates influences its overall effectiveness. However, the ICTR
demonstrated that even in the absence of conflict, the Tribunal was unable to fully
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succeed in achieving its objectives. The ICTY and ICTR are the only ad hoc
international criminal tribunals in existence, and thus my findings must be kept up-todate on the newest developments in prosecutorial accountability mechanisms. Hybrid
tribunals represent the newest development. Due to the fact that the timing of the ICTR
did not solve all problems, it is beneficial to examine how a different factor, structure,
affects a tribunal’s ability to achieve its four objectives. For this reason, this project
concluded with brief case studies of the hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
These two tribunals are similar to the ICTR in that they both were established in
the aftermath of mass violence. This similarity allowed me to examine how the hybrid
structure of the SCSL and ECCC influences effectiveness. Two elements of the hybrid
structure were particularly influential on both tribunals’ ability to achieve their
objectives. These are: the location of the tribunals, and the mixed composition of the
tribunals. First, all existing hybrid tribunals are located in the country in which the
crimes to be prosecuted, were committed. The case studies of the SCSL and ECCC
indicate that this proximity to the most affected population may prove beneficial in their
ability to achieve two objectives in particular—the creation and dissemination of an
accurate historical record, and the deterrence of future atrocities. Second, the case studies
show that the mixed composition of hybrid tribunals allows for interaction and
cooperation between domestic and foreign judges. This could prove advantageous to
augmenting the domestic judicial systems in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. The potential
benefits of proximity and mixed composition may prove helpful in developing future
tribunals that improve upon the ICTR.
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The case study of The Special Court in Sierra Leone demonstrates that its hybrid
structure positively influences its ability to conduct the following activities: collect
evidence, gather witness testimony, and engage with and educate the Sierra Leonean
people. Thus, the SCSL has had the most success in the creation and distribution of an
accurate historical record. Unfortunately, the hybrid structure has also hindered the
SCSL’s ability to fully achieve individual criminal accountability. As a hybrid tribunal,
the SCSL does not enjoy Chapter VII powers, nor does it receive sufficient funding. The
lack of Chapter VII powers has negatively affected its ability to apprehend perpetrators or
demand that third party countries extradite suspects to be tried in the Special Court.
Insufficient funding also restricts the resources available to the SCSL and damages the
likelihood of prosecuting the maximum number of people. The SCSL’s staff, although
ostensibly composed of a mixture of domestic and international personnel, is in actuality
dominated by foreign staff members. There is a lack of well-trained Sierra Leonean
judges and prosecutors.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was established over
three decades after the crimes it seeks to prosecute. Similar to the SCSL and ICTR, the
ECCC was established after conflict. However, whereas the cases of the ICTR and SCSL
demonstrate that post-conflict tribunals enjoy certain benefits, the ECCC indicates that
these benefits are tempered when there is a significant delay between when the relevant
crimes occurred and when the tribunal was established. In the case of the Extraordinary
Chambers, the delayed timing particularly influences its ability to achieve the objective
of individual criminal accountability. With such a large passage of time between the
crimes of the Khmer Rouge and the establishment of the ECCC, evidence is invariably
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lost and witnesses and perpetrators have died. However, while timing did influence the
ECCC’s ability to achieve the first objective, the remaining three objectives were more
greatly influenced by its hybrid structure. The ECCC only recently commenced its first
trial, but the case study demonstrates that the mixed composition of the tribunal and its
location pose benefits and drawbacks to the effectiveness of the ECCC. First, the mixed
composition of the ECCC is such that Cambodian judges retain a majority in both
chambers. Concerns have been raised about the independence of the Cambodian
judges—how much influence does the Cambodian government have on their decisions?
Despite this worry however, certain provisions such as the ‘supermajority’ vote
requirement may ease concerns. Second, the case study of the ECCC demonstrates that
by locating the tribunal in Cambodia, the Cambodian people have greater ownership over
the proceedings.314 I argue that its hybrid structure, particularly the element of location,
may facilitate the ECCC’s ability to create and distribute an accurate historical record to
the Cambodian people.
Implications of findings
This project is significant for two main reasons. First, this project explores the
effectiveness of prosecutorial accountability mechanisms from a previously inadequately
studied angle. In this project I asked two principal questions: 1) How does implementing
a tribunal during conflict influence its ability to achieve its objectives? 2) How does
implementing a tribunal after a conflict has ended influence its ability to achieve its
objectives? My findings, summarized above, are based on deep case studies of the ICTY
and the ICTR. These two tribunals were both established in the early 1990s, in response
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See: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, ed. John D. Ciorciari, Documentation Center of Cambodia (2006).
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to mass human rights violations, by the UN Security Council. Despite these similarities
however, the ICTY was implemented in ongoing conflict and the ICTR was implemented
in the aftermath of conflict. This project sought to explain the influence that these
circumstances had on the tribunals’ effectiveness. Second, the case studies conducted in
this paper contribute to the existing literature on tribunals and international criminal
justice. The two major case studies of the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal
include in-depth analysis of its four objectives. These case studies will hopefully serve as
a resource for other scholars interested in pursuing studies that examine the effectiveness
of existing accountability mechanisms. My specific focus on timing provides an
alternative lens through which to assess existing tribunals.
This project has practical implications for the development of future
accountability mechanisms. With the entry into force of the ICC, it is likely that
indictments will be more frequently issued during ongoing conflict. It is essential that
scholars and policy-makers alike understand the implications that timing has on the
effectiveness of the judicial organ. This project’s analysis of how presence and absence
of conflict influence a tribunals’ ability to achieve its objectives, helps build the
foundation upon which other studies can be conducted. Additionally, all four case studies
revealed some of the strengths and weaknesses of each tribunal. In order to create more
effective and efficient tribunals in the future, we must first understand the source of a
tribunal’s shortcomings. This project suggests that the circumstance, in which a tribunal
is implemented, is one such source.
This project does not merely contribute to existing scholarship; it also raises
important moral questions about the implications of implementing accountability

141

mechanisms for mass human rights violations. My paper argues that ongoing conflict
and continued atrocities hinders a tribunal’s ability to achieve its objectives. This raises a
troubling dilemma: if there is sufficient evidence of mass human rights violations and
there is the political will to implement a tribunal, must an accountability mechanisms be
established even if it may achieve less due to the ongoing violence? If tribunals are not
implemented until atrocities have ceased, by which time many thousands of people will
have been murdered, raped, and tortured, then prosecutorial mechanisms and the fight to
enforce human rights may be de-legitimized. This is a serious consideration that cannot
be ignored. The factors that influence the effectiveness of tribunals must be examined and
understood. But in the search for a more efficient and effective tribunal, we cannot lose
sight of the human beings for whom justice is pursued.
International judicial organs such as the tribunals examined in this project, are
immensely complicated and must contend with the interaction of numerous factors. The
development and use of new forms of accountability mechanism depends upon our
knowledge of those in existence today. None of the tribunals in Rwanda, the former
Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia are without faults. However, they are also not
without promise. Understanding the influence of timing is one important step toward the
establishment of a truly effective prosecutorial accountability mechanism for mass human
rights violations.
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